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This thesis investigates the relation between the vulnerability of various expenditure 
categories and political environment of a country during a fiscal adjustment program. In this 
study, OLS is used at analyzing cross country data. Dependent variables are the 
vulnerabilities of 14 different expenditure categories. In order to explain the dependent 
variables, 22 independent variables are used, which capture political, social and economic 
indicators of countries. Six of them are common to all sectors and they allow us to test the 
hypotheses related to vulnerability of public expenditures and political conditions of a 
country. These variables are indicator of political liberty, index of political stability, 
economic ideology of the ruling elite, the relative size of central government, military 
relations with neighbors and percentage decline in total budget. As a result, all these six 
variables are statistically important factors at determining the vulnerability of expenditure 
sectors.
KEYWORDS: Public Expenditures, Fiscal Adjustment Programs, Budget Cuts, 
Vulnerability of Expenditures, Cross-Sectional Analysis, 
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ÖZET
KAMU HARCAMALARININ KISITLANABİLİRLİĞÎ 
BİR ZAMAN KESİTİ ANALİZİ 
Seçil Özgür
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Y. Doç. Dr. Nader Habibi 
91 Sayfa 
Ağustos, 1997
Bu tez, mali ayarlama programı sırasında, çeşitli harcama kategorilerinin kısıtlanabilirliği ile 
o ülkenin politik düzeni arasındaki ilişkiyi araştırır. Bu çalışmada, çeşitli ülke verilerini 
analiz etmek için OLS metodu kullanılmıştır. Bağımlı değişkenler, 14 farklı harcama 
sectörünün kısıtlanabilirliğidir. Bu bağımlı değişkenleri açıklayabilmek için, ülkelerin 
politik, sosyal ve ekonomik göstergelerini içeren 22 bağımsız değişken kullanılmıştır. 
Bunlardan altı tanesi, bütün sektörlerde ortaktır ve bize kamu harcamalarının 
kısıtlanabilirliği ile o ülkenin politik şartları arasındaki ilişki ile ilgili olan hipotezleri test 
etmemizi sağlar. Bu değişkenler: politik özgürlüğün göstergesi, politik istikrar endeksi, 
yöneten tabakanın ekonomik ideolojisi, merkezi hükümetin göreceli büyüklüğü, komşu 
ülkelerle askeri ilişkiler ve toplam bütçenin kesinti yüzdesi. Sonuç olarak, 6 değişkenin 
tümü harcama sektörlerindeki kısıntılara karar verilmesinde önemli faktörlerdir.
ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Kamu Harcamaları, Mali Ayarlama Programları,
Kısıtlanabilirlik veya Bütçe Kesintileri, Zaman Kesiti Analizi, Ekonomik İdeoloji, Politik 
İstikrar ve Politik Özgürlük .
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fiscal adjustment programs are applied in various countries for decreasing expenditures. 
They are applied according to the characteristics of yarious countries. It is a difficult task to 
determine the size of budget cut and to determine how much will be cut from different 
expenditure categories. In this study that relation will be explored. The purpose of this study 
is to investigate how political, economic and social conditions of a country affect the 
vulnerability of various expenditure categories during such a fiscal adjustment program.
Government expenditure includes all nonrepayable payments by government, whether 
requited or unrequited and whether for current or capital purposes. Several of the 
distinctions within expenditure are of special significance to overall measures of 
governmental economic activity. The classification of expenditure follows two main lines:
- the economic effect of the expenditure upon the community,
- the purpose or function for which the expenditure is made.
In the IMF classification of government expenditure by function, expenditures are 
classified into fourteen major categories. This classification focuses on the purpose for 
which the expenditures were made, irrespective of the government agency through which 
they were made.
Public expenditures are tools of state intervention in order to compensate the failure of 
free market economies and to provide a fair income distribution. Public expenditures are 
related to microeconomy, but they have macroeconomic results. Thus, they are used as a 
mean of macroeconomic policy. Public expenditures are used to achieve certain goals such 
as high growth, low unemployment and(or) low inflation rates. Financial programs are very
widely used economic tool to achieve certain economic targets. This kind of programs are a 
set of coordinated policy measures, mainly monetary and fiscal and balance of payments 
fields. Public expenditure is a major part of the fiscal field of such a program. Restrictions 
on public expenditure are consistent with decreasing the inflation rate (assuming 
accompaniment with monetary policy). If these restrictions are on government consumption 
expenditures, rather than government investment expenditures, then domestic savings will 
increase and, as a result, growth rate will increase. As it can be easily seen, public 
expenditures affect the macroeconomic performance of countries. The composition of 
public expenditure is a very strong mean for politicians to achieve certain goals. Some 
budget categories may be increased, whereas some other budget categories may be 
decreased. In previous studies, it is shown that budget cutting policies change from country 
to country. Hicks and Kubic (1984) and Hicks (1991) have shown that in most countries 
these policies are selective. Some budget categories were cut more than others in relative 
terms. In other words, some sectors were more ‘vulnerable’ than others. In this study, I will 
attempt to identify the political, economic and social determinants of the vulnerability of 
each expenditure category during budget cuts. The main question that I will attempt to 
answer is: Is there any empirical relation between political institutions of a country and the 
vulnerability of functional expenditure categories, when there is a budget reduction in real 
terms?
Identifying such a relation may help predict the consequences of a fiscal program 
depending on the political, economic and social conditions under which it will be 
implemented. It is also important to predict the macroeconomic consequences of adjustment 
programs for foreign investors. International agencies such as IMF or the World Bank can
also use the findings of this study. For example, they can design financial adjustment 
programs, that can be applied easily and within a relatively short period of time.
In Section 2, there will be a literature review on explaining the vulnerability of 
expenditure cuts. In Section 3, the data and the model will be discussed. Also there will be 
comments on results. And in Section 4, conclusion and some further comments will take 
place.
2. LITERATURE SURVEY
There are not many empirical studies on vulnerability of government expenditure 
categories. However, there are some studies on public expenditure, which are closely related 
to the vulnerability problem.
In most studies, the internal allocation of budget deficit and the annual changes of this 
allocation are analyzed. Katz and Rosenberg (1989) asserted that the annual changes in 
budgetary allocation of different expenditures reflects the relative power of pressure groups. 
In response to the non-observability of rent-seeking activities, they have proposed and 
applied an indirect measure of rent dissipation, based on changes in government budgetary 
allocations. Their measure is based on the supposition that any change in budgetary 
allocation is the consequence of rent-seeking activities. Using their measure, they rank 20 
countries according to the social costs of rent-seeking.
Schnytzer (1994) has objections to the study done by Katz and Rosenberg. In his critical 
paper, he points out that the Katz-Rosenberg method can be applied to measure rent-seeking 
either in one country or a number of countries with similar political systems but its use in 
cross-country comparison is subject to severe reservations. Political structures of different 
countries affect political discretion in allocating government expenditures. Indeed, the 
effects of pressure groups differ in democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Even the public 
choice theories, such as Median Voter Theorem and Logrolling Theorem, are not valid in 
semidemocratic and nondemocratic societies. The political objective functions of policy 
makers are different under different regime types. At one extreme, under democratic 
regimes the policy maker is a vote maximizer, whereas at the other extreme, under
nondemocratic regimes, the policy maker is a power maximizer. These different objective 
functions affect the allocation of public expenditures.
Another study related to international comparison of government expenditure is done by 
Heller and Diamond (1990) for developing countries. In this study, linear regression models 
are developed to explain cross-country differences in the ratio of various categories of 
government expenditure to GDP. Explaining the share in GDP of functional expenditure 
categories is a difficult task. In this study, a change in expenditure priorities and in the 
underlying structural equations are tested. As a positive analysis of what has happened to 
expenditure over the period 1975-1986 and of the change in the relative importance of the 
key explanatory variables and the overall robustness of the estimating equations for 
government expenditures, this paper provides some interesting results. In these regressions 
no political variables are used. Independent variables are GNP per capita, population 
distribution over some age groups, infant mortality rate, share of labor force in agriculture, 
share of labor force in industry, share of population in urban areas, population growth rates 
in urban areas, share of manufacturing output in GDP, share of agriculture in GDP, foreign 
debt as percentage of GDP and share of total nonadministrative government expenditure in 
GDP. In this study only economic, social and demographic determinants are tested but no 
political variables are tested.
In recent years, new research has focused on the interrelationship between domestic 
politics and economic performance in developing countries and also in some developed 
countries. There are two such papers, which also influenced taking political variables into 
consideration. Pastor and Hilt (1993) showed that economic variables, such as investment 
function, are a function of two debt measures and several political variables, including
measures of democracy, worker power, and risk. The democracy measure is positively 
signed and significant. The other paper is also an interesting study. Crain and Oakley 
(1995) investigates political institutions and processes underlying the decisions for public 
infrastructure spending. They applied the framework of strategic models of fiscal policy and 
develop an empirical model to analyze the substantial differences in public capital across 
American states. The results suggest that political conditions such as legislative stability and 
voter volatility, as well as institutions such as term limits, citizen initiative, and budgeting 
procedures, are systematically related to infrastructure differences across states. In other 
words, models of strategic fiscal policy predict a bias toward public capital projects in the 
absence of durability-enhancing institutions and stable political regimes.
Sivard (1996) investigated world military and social expenditures (health and education) 
for the year 1996 in a cross sectional framework. This study is descriptive. As a result of 
this work, a table is constructed showing the ranking of 160 countries based on military and 
social indicators. In this work, there is no regression analysis or any statistical test. It only 
shows the different priorities of various countries.
After this point, the papers directly related to this thesis will be described. The following 
two papers provided a starting point for this thesis:
First, Habibi (1994) studied the statistical correlation of political liberty with size and 
internal allocation of public budget (central government). A sample of 67 nations is used to 
study the statistical correlation . Only health and social security are positively related to the 
level of political liberty and defense is negatively related to the level of political liberty. 
Social expenditures are also positively associated.
Second, Fardmanesh and Habibi (1997) showed that expenditure vulnerabilities are 
sensitive to political and institutional conditions. Instead of separate functional expenditure 
categories, they grouped similar expenditure categories into five main groups of 
expenditures. The main sectors were: social, productive, infrastructure, administrative and 
miscellaneous.
As a result of this study, it is observed that higher levels of democracy are associated 
with more vulnerability of all sectors other than the social sector. Political instability 
reduced the vulnerability of social, administrative and miscellaneous sectors, whereas it 
increased the vulnerability of the productive sector. The ideology of the ruling elite was also 
tested and found to be significant. A ruling party at the right wing of the political spectrum 
cuts the social sector budget more and a ruling party at the left wing of the political 
spectrum cuts the productive sector budget more. The relative size of local government is 
also important for infrastructure, administrative, and miscellaneous sectors.
3. THEORY AND APPLICATION
In this study, differing from Fardmanesh and Habibi (1997), 14 subsectors will be 
analyzed . The main sectors and their subsectors' are:
1. Social Sector:
- Education
- Health
- Social Security and Welfare
- Housing and Community Amenities
- Other Community and Social Services
2. Productive Sector:
- Agriculture and Forestry
- Mining, Materials and Manufacturing
3. Infrastructure Sector:
- Fuel and Energy
- Transportation and Communication
4. Administrative Sector:
- General Public Services
- Defense
- Public Order and Safety
5. Miscellaneous Sector:
- Other Economic Affairs
- Other Expenditures
'These are the same sectors used in Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (IMF - 1997).
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3.1. Hypothesis :
In this study, the following hypothesis related to functional categories of expenditures 
will be tested:
1. In fiscal adjustment periods, social expenditures^ are less vulnerable in more 
democratic societies.
2. In fiscal adjustment periods, social expenditures are less vulnerable in unstable 
countries.
3. Infrastructure expenditures^ are more protected under stable and undemocratic regime 
types.
4. The restrictions on expenditures in periods of fiscal adjustment depend on Political 
Culture.
3.2. Theory:
In this part, a hypothetical model will be developed. This model is a public choice 
model. The ruling elite of a country (prime minister, cabinet, legislature) has a political 
objective function consisting of functional public expenditures. This ruling elite is 
responsible for all stages of the budget process and their political utility functions depend 
also upon the budget process of the allocation of resources among various spending 
ministries. The budget process in this model is assumed as follows: First, the total 
government budget (G) is decided based on estimated government revenues, government 
borrowing conditions and macroeconomic targets. Second, the optimal internal allocation is 
decided between various government expenditures (Gi). S Gi = G.
 ^ Social Sector, as explained in the previous page. (Including all subsectors). 
 ^ Including all subsectors.
The utility function of the ruling elite has two components, which includes both selfish 
and benevolent objectives.
In W = a  In(Wr)+p In(Wa) (1)
where Wr = Wr (Gl, G 2,.... , Gi,...) and
Wa = W a(Gl,G2,..... ,Gi,...) i=l,2,3,.... ,n.
Wr shows the political rent-seeking behavior of the ruling elite. In other words, this 
component captures the political benefits which the ruling class could obtain for itself by 
using various expenditure categories. Populist policies are establishing good examples for 
such politics. Giving high minimum price for some agricultural outputs such as wheat, 
sugar, etc. transfers resources to the urban population for the sake of gaining political 
support in the nearest election.
Wa shows the altruistic component of the ruling elite. Various expenditure categories are 
decided in order to increase public welfare of both the current and the following 
generations. The preferences of the whole society for socio-economic development are 
captured by this component.
The following mathematical methodology is borrowed from Fardmanesh and Flabibi 
(1997), which is the starting point of this work. In order to simplify the mathematical 
derivation we assume that both Wa and Wr have Cobb-Douglas functional forms, and in 
order to ease the mathematical derivation, we take only three expenditure categories.
In (Wr) = yl In (Gl) + y2 In (G2) + y3 In(G3) (2.1)
In (Wa) = XI In(Gl) + X2 ln(G2) + X3 ln(G3) (2.2)
If we substitute (2.1) and (2.2) into the equation (1), we get:
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In W = a  { yl In(Gl) + y2 ln(G2) + y3 ln(G3)} +
p { X\ In(Gl) + U  ln(G2) + X3 lii(G3)} (3)
The ruling elite maximizes In W subject to total budget constraint E Gi = G. If we 
rewrite the ruling elite’s maximization problem:
In W = (ayl + pA,l) In(Gl) + (ay2 + PX,2) ln(G2) + (ay3 + PA,3) ln(G3) 
subject to G1 + G2 + G3 = G (4)
The first order conditions are:
(ayi+pX.i) / Gi = h ,i= 1,2,3 where h is Lagrange Multiplier.
G1 + G2 + G3 -  G .
If we solve for Gi we get the following formula:
Gi = { (a yi +p A,i) / S  (a yi +P A.i)} G (5)
Equation 5 is a demand function for each expenditure category.
Vulnerability of any expenditure category shows the sensitivity of the expenditure 
category in any fiscal adjustment program. In the above formula, in order to simplify 
computations, we assume that Eyi =1 and ZA.i = 1, and we can assume that a  + P = 1 . 
After these assumptions, the denominator of equation 5 is equal to 1. Thus, we can write 
equation 5 as follows:
Gi = (a yi+p Xi) G (S’)
If we take a difference function for changes in expenditure categories, we get the following 
formula:
AGi = (yi.Aa + a.Ayi + A,i .Ap + p.AA,i).G + (a.yi + p.A,i) AG (6)
If we divide both sides of this equation by AG and multiply by G / Gi , we get the 
vulnerability equation of each separate category.
II
Vi = (AGi / AG ) . (G / Gi ) = ( K . G. G / G i. AG ) + (a yi +P A-i). G / Gi or
Vi = (G / Gi ) . { K / g + (a yi +P Ai)} 
where g = AG / G and K = (yi.Aa + a.Ayi + Ai .Ap + p.AAi) .
Here, it can be observed which variables affect vulnerability function. In a closed formula,
vulnerability depends on g, percentage change of total budget; a, the elasticity of the rent- 
seeking component of the objective function of the ruling elite; P, the elasticity of the 
altruistic component of the objective function of the ruling elite; yi, the share of expenditure 
category of rent-seeking component; Ai, the share of expenditure category of altruistic 
component and their differences (Aa, Ap, Ayi, AAi ). G / Gi is a function of political 
variables. In this description, only g is calculated directly. All the other variables are the 
mathematical solution of the model and these variables cannot be observed directly. Even 
though we cannot observe these variables directly, an indirect method can be used. Since 
these variables are affected by political, social and economic conditions, we can, instead, 
use other directly observable political, economic and demographic variables.
What could be possible political variables that they should be taken into consideration?
The level of democracy affects these variables in several ways. According to the level of 
democracy, the share of different components of objective function changes. The optimal 
composition of altruistic and rent-seeking components vary from one society to another in 
order to maximize the utility function of the ruling elite. In more democratic societies, the 
ruling elite is responsible to the public and they are more open to inspection. Thus, they 
have to spend resources very carefully and in a way which increases public welfare. In a 
nondemocratic society, there is not much inspection, because of nonopenness or because of
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the lack of the inspection mechanism. In such a circumstance, politicians are less careful 
about spending public resources in a proper manner.
Political stability is another political variable which affects the components of the 
objective function. Political instability may cause the ruling elite to follow more populist 
policies. In such a conjuncture, the incumbent government is more myopic and is concerned 
with only the next election instead of the next generation. Education and health are the 
candidates most vulnerable in expenditure categories for such a government.
The economic ideology of the ruling elite is another political variable that is expected to 
effect components of the objective function. For example, a socialist party allocates more 
resources to Social Security and Welfare, and Health expenditures. A right wing party may 
give more importance to the infrastructure sector. Education can be equally important for 
both parties.
The administration type of a country plays also an important role in allocating resources 
in the best possible way. The levels of government (state, federal and local) and the relative 
size of local government to the state government should be one of the directly observable 
political variables to be used in the model. If local governments are strong enough, the state 
government can give less resources for some local services. In that case, central government 
can deal with nation-wide projects such as defense. Defense expenditure will be higher than 
Housing and Community Amenities, if the latter is done by local government.
The development level of a country is also an important factor, while determining the 
internal allocation of government expenditure. The priorities for a developed country are 
definitely different than a developing country. Per capita income can be an observable 
variable, which indicates the development level of a country.
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If we summarize the short explanations, the following variables will be used in the 
model in order to find equations of vulnerability of expenditure categories:
- The level of democracy
- The degree of political stability
- Economic ideology of the ruling elite
- Border tension and political relations with neighbors
- The relative size of the central government budget compared to the budget of the state 
and local governments
- Percentage decline in the real value of total central government expenditures (g)
- Other social, economic and demographic variables that are specific to each expenditure 
category
- Some macroeconomic indicators such as real GNP and central government budget 
deficit as a percentage of GDP
After substituting these variables into the vulnerability function, we can start 
econometric analysis.
3.3. Statistical Methods and Data Description:
In this thesis, in order to find vulnerability equations, ordinary least square method is 
used. Expenditures are classified in fourteen groups, as mentioned above, based on 
functional type. Cross-country analysis is used for regression analysis. The data on various 
functional expenditure categories is taken from the IMF-Government Financial Statistics 
Yearbook (GFS).
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The sample period covers the period between 1980-1989. Our unit of observation in this 
analysis is country/interval (e.g., Brazil / 1985-1986). Among the member countries of IMF, 
the countries were selected in which at least a 1.5 % decline in real terms in consecutive 
years was observed. Small countries, whose population are less than one million, were 
eliminated. 70 different nations were included in this work. The total number of 
observations is 140 during this period. Each observation, belonging to a country, is 
between starting and ending year. The vulnerabilities of the fourteen expenditure sectors are 
calculated according to the following formula:
Vi = ( AGi / A G ). ( G / G i) = ( AGi / Gi ).  (G / A G )
As explained above, only real budget cuts are considered. Thus, AG is always negative. If 
there is a cut in one expenditure sector, then AGi will also be negative. As a result, the 
vulnerability, Vi , will be positive if there is a cut in ith sector when there is a real budget 
cut and the vulnerability will be negative if there is an increase in ith sector when there is a 
real budget cut.
In Table Al, the sample averages of sectoral vulnerabilities can be seen for the data set. 
According to this table, regarding the whole sample, transportation and communication, 
housing and community amenities and fuel and energy expenditures are more vulnerable 
than other sectors. These sectors are also more vulnerable than other sectors regarding the 
sample in which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger than the median of 
the whole sample. Public Order and Safety expenditures increased even though there was a 
real budget cut. Although the sample is too limited to make generalizations, this is the result 
of our sample. Education is the most protected sector compared to other sectors, regarding
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the whole sample and the sample in which the reduction in total government expenditure is 
larger than the median of the whole sample.
During these regressions, totally 22 independent variables are used. However, six of 
them are common to all sectors. These six independent variables allow us to test the 
hypotheses related to vulnerability of public expenditures and political conditions of a 
country. These variables are:
1. Indicator of democracy and political liberty
2. Index of political stability
3. Economic ideology of the ruling elite
4. The relative size of central government
5. Military relations with the neighbors
6. Percentage decline in total budget
Except for those six variables, other economic, social and demographic characteristics vary 
from one expenditure sector to another. In the following paragraphs, the description and 
source of these variables can be found:
1. Indicator of Democracy and Political Liberty:
GastiTs index“’ of political liberty is used in this work. This index gives a score between 
one and seven to each nation. The score one represents total democracy and the score seven 
represents dictatorship. For each observation, the previous five years average of Gastil’s 
index of the country is used.
' Source: Freedom House Publication (New York).
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2. Index of Political Stability:
Gupta (1992) suggests an index of political stability in order to measure that variable. In 
his method, he estimates political instability variable as a function of political events such as 
political strikes, number of executions, number of coups or riots per year by using a linear 
regression model. After that estimation, he used this model in order to calculate the index of 
political instability for the period 1948-1982.
A second political index is provided by Barro (1991). He provides one index for 
assassinations and one index for revolution and coup. As a political stability, the averages 
of these two indexes are used.
In the regressions, in some cases Gupta’s index gave reasonable results and in some other 
cases Barro’s index gave better results.
3. Economic Ideology of the Ruling Elite:
Economic ideology plays a major role in internal allocation of the budgetary allocation. 
For this variable, a dummy is used. 0 for left wing regime and center and 1 for right wing 
regime. Social security and welfare expenditures are more important under a left wing 
regime compared to right wing. Productive and infrastructure groups may be more 
important under a right wing regime compared to the left wing. Thus, economic ideology of 
the ruling elite has a major effect on the vulnerabilities of public expenditure.
4. The Relative Size of Central Government:
This factor is also among the major determinants of allocating resources internally. The 
effectiveness of local governments and their own budget changes the fiscal decisions of 
government. In this work, in order to find the relative size of central government, state and
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local government budgets are summed up. This value is divided by the central government 
budget. The values from GFS data are used.
5. Military Relations with Neighbors:
This factor is extremely important for the relative size of defense expenditure. In order to 
measure this factor we use two indicators. One of them is a dummy, which shows whether a 
country is at war. For the second variable, three different values are possible: 1, 2 or 3 
indicates the degree of tension at the border.
6. Percentage Decline in Total Budget:
This variable is the only one in our theoretical model which is directly observable and in 
this model, vulnerability is directly related to the percentage decline in total budget. This 
value is calculated as AG / G. In order to prove this assertion. Table A1 may be enough. 
The different values of vulnerabilities for the same public expenditures are due to different 
levels of percentage decline in total budget.
In addition to these variables, some other technical, economic, social and demographic 
variables are also used in regressions. The socio-economic of these variables used for each 
category varies from other categories.. Other independent variables according their 
categories are as follows:
- Economic variables: debt ratio to GDP; total expenditure as a percentage of GDP; 
overall deficit as a percentage of GDP; domestic debt as a percentage of GDP; foreign debt 
as a percentage of GDP; real GNP per capita; share of agriculture in total output; share of 
industry in total output.
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- Demographic variables: dependency ratio (total percentage of population of children 
under 14 and of adults over 60); share of labor in industry; urban population as a percentage 
of total population in the starting year .
3.4. Statistical Analysis:
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics:
The descriptive statistics of the data gives some idea for vulnerabilities of some 
expenditure sectors. The descriptive results can be seen in Tables A1-A6.
In Table A1 the average vulnerability of expenditure sectors can be observed. Fuel and 
Energy, Transport and Communication, Agriculture and Forestry, Education, Social 
Security and Welfare sectors are not very sensitive to the real budget decline. In Table A2, 
the correlation between sectoral vulnerabilities can be seen. The sample characteristics 
differ. The descriptive result of Fardmanesh and Habibi (1997) results are confirmed in 
these tables also. They found that there is a positive correlation between the administrative 
and social sectors. According to our results, there are positive correlation between each 
subgroup of these main sectors.
Table A4 shows the vulnerabilities under different levels of political liberty. According 
to the results, housing and community amenities are the more vulnerable sectors. Whereas, 
health and social security and welfare are the most protected sectors under democratic 
regimes. Under semidemocratic regimes, the subsectors of the social and administrative 
sectors are less vulnerable with respect to others. Under nondemocratic regimes, mining.
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materials and manufacturing sectors are more vulnerable than others and defense is the most 
protected sector. The level of vulnerabilities are not monotone except for social sector 
expenditures. The vulnerability value of social sector expenditures increases from 
democratic societies to nondemocratic societies. In semidemocratic societies, housing and 
community amenities, mining, materials and manufacturing and transportation and 
communication are more protected as compared to these sectors vulnerability in democratic 
and nondemocratic regimes.
In Table A5 are the average vulnerabilities for different levels of political stability based 
on Gupta’s index. For the whole sample, it is observed that housing and community 
amenities and mining, materials and manufacturing sectors are more vulnerable under stable 
regimes. Public Order and Safety is most protected. Social security and welfare 
expenditures are more protected. Under semi-stable regimes, the housing and community 
amenities sectors are again the more vulnerable. In addition to public order and safety, 
education is the most protected sector. Under unstable regimes, productive, infrastructure 
and miscellaneous sectors become more vulnerable and health and all other administrative 
and social sectors are protected compared to former sectors.
In Table A6, the vulnerabilities of different continents can be compared for each sector. 
Even for the same expenditure type, there is high diversity between continents. The largest 
diversity is observed in public order and safety. However, we can ignore this sector because 
there are not enough observations. If we omit this sector from consideration, other 
community and social services, general public services, and mining, materials and 
manufacturing sectors have very different vulnerabilities across continents.
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3.4.2. Regression Analysis:
The results of the estimation equations can be seen in Tables B1-B14. Each table will be 
explained in a detailed way in following subsections as well. Before discussing the results 
for each category, there are some general comments which are valid for all of the 
estimations. There are 140 observations on real budget cuts. However, we do not have 140 
observations for each independent variable and sectoral percentage changes. Thus, the 
number of observations used in the regressions are less than 140. In most of the cases, 
sample restrictions were imposed because there were several outliers with high absolute 
values, which could change each coefficient of the estimation equation. These outliers are 
eliminated. There is statistical limitation of the data and a number of indicators could be 
used to test different hypotheses. A given variable can explain quite different categories of 
expenditure. There is an ambiguity, which makes interpretation difficult. Another problem 
related to the data is the multicollinearity problem. This problem produces a large number 
of insignificant estimated coefficients. As a result, testing particular hypotheses or 
estimating the importance of variables is extremely difficult. For detecting 
heteroskedasticity, Eicher-White test is performed for all equations listed in the tables and 
heteroskedasticity problem is not detected. With these constraints and limitations, the aim of 
these regressions was not to maximize R^ , but to include the main political variables into 
model. In the rest of this section, the regression analysis of fourteen expenditure categories 
will be explained.
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3.4.2.I. General Public Services:
General public services includes financial administration and general administration such 
as planning, statistics, etc. In Table Bl, there are 5 regression results related to general 
public services. Since there was a lot of dispersion and outliers, there were better results by 
restricting the sample between -1.5 and 2.5.
The variable for the level of democracy in this expenditure type is tested in equation 1 
and equation 2 in Table Bl. This variable is insignificant and shows erratic behavior. It 
takes both positive and negative values, it does not keep the sign in two subsequent 
regressions. Thus, it can be said that the vulnerability of general public services is 
statistically insignificant to the level of democracy.
Two indices for political stability are tested with different combinations of other 
variables. This variable is insignificant in both cases. (Regressions 1 to 5 in Table Bl).
The coefficient for economic ideology is positive in all regressions and this variable is 
significant in the last equation. The interpretation of a positive sign is that under a right 
wing regime, this expenditure is more vulnerable.
The indicator of war or border tension, has a negative sign but this variable is also 
insignificant. The existence of border tension or war decreases the vulnerability of general 
public services.
The relative size of state and local government to the central government makes this 
item more vulnerable. This is very reasonable. If some public services could be done by 
local governments, then central government could allocate less resources for these services.
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The relative size of a budget cut has a negative effect. If the real budget cut increases, the 
vulnerability of this sector will decrease. There may be other cuts in budget expenditures, 
however, other sectors will be affected more.
Except for these variables, there are other economic and technical variables which are 
significant. Average population growth rate is significant and has a positive coefficient. 
With increasing population, the relative importance of these services may decrease as 
compared to other sectors. Industrial output share in total output has a negative relation; 
central government budget deficit has a negative relation and domestic debt has a positive 
relation. If domestic debt increases, then this sector becomes more vulnerable. In short, it 
can be said that general public services are related to economic indicators. Vulnerability is 
not related to political variables because they are minimal public services to be carried out 
and it is not important by whom they are made.
3.4.2.2. Defense:
Defense includes all defense expenditures except those for military pension. Again the 
sample is restricted between -2.5 and 4.5 in order to eliminate outliers. The regression 
results can be seen in Table B2.
Political liberty variable is insignificant and has both positive and negative signs. By 
looking at significance levels, the negative sign is dominant. Thus, in nondemocratic 
societies, vulnerability of defense expenditure decreases. This means that nondemocratic 
societies spend more on defense.
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For political stability variable, Barro’s index is used. This variable is significant and has 
a negative sign. The interpretation is that, in unstable societies, the vulnerability of defense 
expenditure is smaller, which is as we expected.
The tension at a border has positive and significant values. Here, the index is ordered in 
the reverse. Thus, this result is reasonable and expected. If the borderline tension increases, 
then the vulnerability on defense expenditure will be less: More resources will be allocated 
to the defense side.
Of the economic ideology variable can be said, this variable has never become 
significant. The economic ideology of the ruling elite is not important, if there are actual 
cases such as war, political instability and dictatorship. The conditions of a country affect 
defense expenditure much more than the economic ideology of the ruling elite.
The relative size of local government to central government is insignificant. This result is 
also very reasonable. Defense is a nationwide issue and local governments cannot change 
any decision related to defense.
The relative size of a budget cut has a negative coefficient. This means that, if there is a 
real decline, vulnerability will increase. The defense expenditure is cut at the same 
proportion as the total budget deficit.
There are also other economic and demographic variables. These are: the share of 
industry in total output, this variable is significant and has a negative sign; the share of labor 
in industry, which is significant, has a negative coefficient; the variable total expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP is significant and has a negative value. If more resources from GDP 
are used, then the expenditures for defense increases also. The variable central government
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budget deficit is positive but not significant. If government deficit increases then the 
vulnerability will be more. Real GNP per capita has a positive coefficient. A possible 
explanation for this is that, in wealthier countries, political stability is achieved and there is 
less need for military forces.
3.4.2.3. Public Order and Safety:
Public Order and Safety expenditures include justice and police. There are very limited 
observations for this sector. There are 44 observations totally and if we eliminate the 
outliers, there remain 25 observations for each regression and the independent variables are 
highly correlated, the significance levels of equation 1 in Table B3 are not correct. A similar 
problem can be observed also in equation 2. In order to solve multicollinearity system, 
another estimation is done. The equations 3,4 and 5 are more reliable results.
The variable of political liberty has a negative sign but is not significant. In a 
dictatorship, more resources should be allocated in order to provide public order. Whereas, 
under democratic regimes, less resources are allocated for the same purpose.
The variable of political stability has also a negative sign and is not significant as well. 
The reason stated above is also valid for this variable.
The coefficient of the index for the economic ideology is positive and significant, which 
is difficult to interpret. However, in this sample there are not enough observations to make 
reasonable decisions.
The coefficient of border tension is positive and insignificant. If the border tension 
increases, then resources are used for defense instead of public order and safety, and this 
expenditure is cut.
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The relative size of local government to central government is positive but insignificant. 
This result is also expected, because provision of public order and safety are among the 
main duties of the central government.
The real decline in budget cut is positive and significant. If there is a real cut in budget, 
then the vulnerability will be more for this sector.
Central government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP has a negative sign and it is 
statistically significant. This shows that, governments finance these expenditures by giving 
deficits. An increase in deficit and an increase in public order and safety expenditures show 
a high correlation.
3.4.2.4. Education:
Education expenditure is among the social sector expenditures. The result of regression 
analysis can be seen in Table B4. The coefficient political liberty variable has a negative 
sign. This result does not match what we expected. In nondemocratic societies, education 
becomes more important and education expenditures are less vulnerable. The coefficient of 
political stability is also negative and in the last two regressions it becomes significant. In 
highly unstable societies, more resources are allocated to education. The indicator of war or 
border tension has a negative coefficient. During war or in such periods, education 
expenditure becomes less vulnerable. The relative size of local government has a positive 
coefficient and has a significant effect. This result is expected. If local governments are 
more developed, they can also start financing education and this procedure causes central 
government to allocate fewer resources. The relative size of a budget cut, or decline in real 
total government expenditure, has a significant positive effect on education expenditures. 
When there is a decline in real government expenditures, then vulnerability will increase.
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There are also other significant variables showing the effects of other economic 
indicators. The share of industry in total output and share of labor in the industrial sector 
have significant and negative effects. If a country becomes more industrialized, in order to 
maintain this position, the vulnerability of education should decrease. Education should be 
more important. The variable of central government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP 
has a positive effect. If deficit increases, vulnerability will also increase. Real GNP per 
capita has a negative and significant effect on education. We can say that, if a country gets 
richer, vulnerability will decrease. Education is very important for developing countries. 
Domestic debt variable has an effect similar to deficit variable. Another interesting 
significant variable, here, is share of agricultural output in total output. This variable has a 
negative sign. Countries, in which agriculture plays an important role, start giving more 
importance to education in order to develop faster. The variable total expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP has a negative significant effect. If expenditure share increases, then 
education will obtain more resources. The variable dependency ratio, which shows the ratio 
of children under 14 and adults over 60 within the population, has a negative significant 
effect in the first two equations in Table B4. If there is an increase in population of children 
under 14, then education should be less vulnerable.
3.4.2.5. Health:
The health category includes: government expenditure on general administration, 
regulation, and research for health; on hospitals, medical and dental centers, and clinics; on 
population control, immunization, and inoculation; and on blood donor services. It also 
covers reimbursement for services outside hospitals and clinics. The regression results are 
in Table B5. Again in order to obtain reliable results and in order to eliminate outliers, we
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restricted the sample between -1.5 and 2.5. The political liberty has an ambiguous effect on 
health, it has a negative sign in one regression and a positive sign in another regression, both 
insignificant. Political stability has positive and significant effects on health expenditure. In 
highly unstable societies, health expenditure is more vulnerable. The coefficient of the index 
for economic ideology has a negative and significant effect. Under a conservative party, 
health expenditure is less vulnerable. The variable indicating war or border tension has a 
negative and significant effect. Under such conditions, health becomes more important and 
health expenditures are less vulnerable. The relative size of local government has a positive 
effect on these expenditures. This variable is significant except for the last equation. Some 
health services are fulfilled by local governments and municipalities. As their shares 
increases, it is reasonable to expect that the health expenditures become more vulnerable 
and central government will allocate fewer resources. If there is a larger decline in real total 
government expenditures, then social expenditures become more vulnerable, since this 
variable is positive and significant.
In addition to political variables, there are two more variables which effect health 
expenditure. Real GNP per capita has a negative and significant effect. In richer or more 
developed countries, health expenditures are less vulnerable. Deficit variable is also tested. 
It has a negative and insignificant effect on health expenditures. Regional dummies are also 
tested but none of them become significant. Although it is expected that the dependency 
ratio, birth and population growth rates and poor access to clean water would have a 
significant effect, none of them has a statistically significant influence on the vulnerability 
of health expenditure.
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3.4.2.6. Social Security and Welfare:
The social security and welfare category includes expenditure on social security 
(sickness, old age, disability payments, pension and disability plans for government 
employees, civilian and military). It also includes unemployment, family, maternity, and 
child allowances, as well as any other public assistance. Welfare services include care of 
elderly, disabled and mentally impaired, and children. The regression results related to 
social security and welfare can be seen in Table B6. The political liberty variable has a 
negative significant effect on the vulnerability of the social sector and welfare. In 
nondemocratic societies, the vulnerability of the social sector is less. Regarding other 
political variables, political stability has a similar effect as political liberty. In unstable 
regimes, vulnerability is less. This can be explained by populist policies. Incumbent 
government prefers to have more support from the public by transferring more resources to 
them. The coefficient of the economic ideology variable is positive and significant. A 
conservative party cuts social welfare expenditure more than a labor party during a budget 
cut. The war or border tension indicator has a negative and significant effect. During war or 
if there is a tension with neighbors, social security expenditure becomes less vulnerable. In 
this case, such a comment may be valid :^ During the periods of external conflict, 
governments are also concerned with the possibility of internal unrest and in order to 
maintain social stability, they preserve social security and welfare expenditure in spite of 
budgetary pressures.
The relative size of local government again plays an important role in the vulnerability of 
social security and welfare expenditure. This variable has a positive coefficient and is
Fardmanesh and Habibi (1997), page 20
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statistically significant. Some services for care of the elderly, disabled, mentally impaired 
and children can be fulfilled by municipalities and local governments. If these state or local 
governments are developed enough in order to perform such services, then central 
government can cut welfare expenditures more during fiscal adjustment programs. The real 
cuts of budget expenditure have a positive impact on these expenditures but it is 
insignificant.
Other than those political variables, in the regression table there are economic and 
demographic variables, which are significant. Share of industrial labor and share of industry 
in total output are two variables, whose effects are similar to each other. Both have negative 
and significant effects. In industrialized countries, it is difficult to cut from social security 
expenditures. In more developed countries, there is more labor force and most of the labor 
uses social security programs. Thus, in such countries social security expenditure is less 
vulnerable. Real GNP per capita has significant and negative impact. In richer countries, 
social security expenditures are less vulnerable. They may consider other expenditure 
sectors in order to design a fiscal adjustment program. Domestic and foreign debt as a 
percentage of total expenditure shows positive correlation with social security and welfare 
expenditures and both debt variables are significant. If debt level increases, foreign or 
domestic, the vulnerability of this sector will increase as well. The dependency ratio is 
negatively related to the vulnerability of this sector. If the dependency ratio increases, the 
vulnerability will decrease. This portion of the population covers both adults over 60, who 
receive pension and children under 14, who may need extra care for several reasons. Central 
government budget deficit has a negative significant relation. This relation does not seem
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reasonable, however, if the budget deficit is increasing and there is relaxation from budget 
deficits, governments do not cut social security and welfare expenditures.
3.4.2.7. Housing Community and Amenities:
The category of housing and community amenities covers the provision of housing and 
housing payments tied to the income level of the recipient. It also includes rent subsidies, 
some home purchase subsidies (exclusive of tax expenditures), and any administrative costs. 
The regression results are in Table B7. For this expenditure category we had to restrict our 
sample between -5 and 7 in order to capture the highest density of distribution of 
observations and to eliminate outliers. First, we will analyze the political variables. If we 
look at the coefficient of political liberty, this variable is positively related to the 
vulnerability of housing and community amenities. This variable is also statistically 
significant. Under nondemocratic regimes, the vulnerability of this expenditure category 
increases. Regarding political instability, higher levels of political instability are associated 
with a lower degree of vulnerability of housing and community amenities. Again these kind 
of policies are indicators of populist policies. Economic ideology has an ambiguous effect 
on vulnerability and, in this regression table, economic ideology is insignificant. The war or 
border tension indicator has a positive insignificant relation. Since, there were 
multicollinearity problems, this variable is omitted before doing other regressions. The 
relative size of local government has a positive effect on the vulnerabilities of this sector. 
This is an expected result, because local governments are very effective at providing 
housing, land and financial aid. Thus, if there are strong local governments, then this 
expenditure can be cut more easily. The relative size of the budget cut shows significant and 
negative relation with the vulnerability of this expenditure. If there is a real budget cut, then
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the vulnerabilities will decrease. There is a relative increase in allocation of resources for 
housing and community amenities.
Other than political variables, there are other economic and social variables, which 
effects are significant as regression results. We will discuss whether they also have 
interpretable meanings. Share of labor in industry and dependency ratio have positive and 
significant relations with the vulnerability of housing and community amenities. Dependent 
population do not really need separate housing. If their share increases in population, the 
vulnerability will increase. The labor working in industry in the private sector can receive 
support or financial aid from funds which are carried out by the private sector. Real per 
capita GNP has a positive and significant relation. If society becomes wealthier, 
vulnerability will increase. People may not need special aid for housing. Central 
government budget deficit has a positive and significant effect. If budget deficit increases, 
vulnerability will increase also. The variable showing total expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP shows a negative and significant relation. If total expenditure increases a percentage of 
GDP, vulnerability will decrease, which causes an increase in total resources allocated for 
housing and community amenities. Average population growth rate has a positive and 
insignificant relation. Since it causes a multicollinearity problem, this variable is also 
omitted from the equation .
3.4.2.8. Other Community and Social Services:
In this sector, there are cultural and recreational services. The regression results are in 
Table B8. The independent variables are in the interval between -5 and 7. The political 
liberty variable is negatively related to the independent variable and shows statistical 
insignificance. In nondemocratic societies, the vulnerability of cultural activities are less.
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Political stability variable is also similar to political liberty variable. Both political variables 
are negative and insignificant. Under unstable regimes, vulnerability becomes less. 
Economic ideology variable is positive and significant variable. Right wing parties cut 
cultural expenditure more than left wing parties. The war or border tension indieator has a 
negative insignificant coefficient. This negative value is consistent, because the variable is 
reverse ordered. If there is a war or danger of war, vulnerability will be higher. The relative 
size of local government has a positive significant effect on vulnerabilities of cultural 
activities. This result is also expected and reasonable, since most of the cultural activities 
are organized locally by state and local governments, unless the organization is nationwide. 
Thus, the relative budgets of local governments are important factors for central 
governments in the decision process. If local governments are big enough, vulnerability will 
be higher. The relative size of budget cuts has an ambiguous effect, in terms of direction, 
and is statistically insignificant.
Among the nonpolitieal variables, total expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and central 
government deficit as a percentage of GDP, have negative relations with the vulnerability 
of cultural activities and the former is significant. As total expenditure share increases, then 
the vulnerability will deerease. If deficit increases, vulnerability will decrease but 
insignificantly. Both share of agriculture in total output and share of industry in total output 
have negative relations and are statistically significant. Higher production is associated with 
lower vulnerability values. Average population growth rate has a positive significant effect 
on vulnerability. Share of labor in the industrial sector is also positively related but is 
statistically insignificant.
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3.4.2.9. Fuel and Energy:
In this category, electricity, natural gas, steam, and water, expenditure related to the 
production and distribution of electricity, natural gas, or steam are included. The mining of 
natural gas, which is classified under mining, is not included. This category also includes 
expenditure on the regulation, purification and distribution of clean water for general use 
but not for irrigation. The regression results can be seen in Table B9. Since, there are 
characteristics peculiar to countries, the sample is very much dispersed. The sample interval 
is restricted between -5 and 15.
The coefficient of the political liberty variable has a positive and significant sign. Under 
dictatorships, this expenditure category is cut more, whereas, under democracy this sector is 
protected more. In order to test political stability, Gupta’s index is used. Political instability 
is positively correlated and significant. Higher levels of political instability cause higher 
levels of vulnerability in the fuel and energy sectors. If there is political instability, then 
politicians should follow populist policies, which are mainly in the social sector. Other 
sectors can be ignored for a short period of time. Economic ideology is negatively related to 
the vulnerability of fuel and energy expenditures and this relation is statistically significant. 
The fuel and energy expenditures are more protected under right wing regimes. The 
indicator of war (dummy variable) is tested and this variable has a negative and significant 
effect. In war, these expenditures will be more protected because this category has strategic 
importance. The relative size of local government is negatively and significantly related to 
the vulnerability of the fuel and energy sector. The percentage decline in real total 
government expenditure has a negative and significant effect. During the real budget cuts, 
these sectors are protected more.
34
Share of labor in the industrial sector is positively and significantly related to the 
dependent variable. Total expenditure as a percentage of GDP, overall deficit as a 
percentage of GDP, domestic debt as a percentage of total expenditure and dependency ratio 
are positively correlated with the vulnerability of the fuel and energy expenditures.
3.4.2.10. Agriculture and Forestry:
This expenditure category includes the provision of agricultural services and financial 
support programs for farm prices and incomes. Forestry and inland and ocean fishing 
programs, as well as research in all these areas, are also included. In this sample, the 
dependent variable was very much dispersed, thus the sample interval was between -8 and 
10. The territorial and climate differences of countries may be the cause for so much 
dispersion. The regression equations can be seen in Table BIO.
The political liberty variable is negatively correlated and is statistically significant. 
Higher levels of repression and dictatorship are associated with less vulnerability. This 
result confirms the findings of the previous results .^ The productive sectors are more 
protected under nondemocratic regimes, since there is no need for populist policies and 
production can be promoted. To test political stability, Gupta’s index is used. Political 
stability has a positive effect but is insignificant. If there is highly unstable government, 
populist policies may be preferred, and as a result, vulnerability is higher in productive 
sectors. This result is also consistent with the findings of Fardmanesh and Habibi (1997). 
The coefficients of the index for economic ideology of the ruling regime show that, under 
conservative right wing regimes, the productive sector is more protected. (Less 
vulnerability, negative coefficient). Production is more important for conservatives than
S ee  F ardm anesh and H abibi (1 9 9 7 ) , p age  18.
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liberals. The indicator of war and border tension has a positive and insignificant effect. If 
there is such a danger, then production related expenditure is cut. The relative size of the 
government has a significant positive effect on the vulnerability of agriculture and forestry 
expenditure. Local funds and financial support programs subsidied into agriculture 
expenditure and such services are extensively provided by local governments. As a result, in 
financial adjustment programs, such expenditures are cut more. Thus, the vulnerability is 
higher. The percentage decline in real total government expenditure (relative size of a 
budget cut) has a negative impact and is insignificant as well. As the total budget cut 
increases, vulnerability will decrease.
There are also nonpolitical significant variables. Share of industry in total output and 
share of labor in industry shows similar behavior . Both are statistically significant and have 
a negative impact on the vulnerability of agriculture and forestry expenditure. It can be a 
state policy to support agriculture in order to keep people in rural areas to conduct 
agricultural production. It also could be that in industrial countries farmers are better 
organized and have more political power as a pressure group. Thus, these coefficients show 
that, if industrialization increases, then the vulnerability will be less for agriculture and 
forestry. There are three more macroeconomic variables. Two of them, overall deficit as a 
percentage of GDP and domestic debt as a percentage of total expenditure have a negative 
and significant effect on the vulnerability of this sector. Central government budget deficit 
as a percentage of GDP is positively correlated with vulnerability but it is not significant.
3.4.2.11. Mining, Materials and Manufacturing:
The category of mining, materials and manufacturing includes expenditures related to 
mining, natural resources, manufacturing and nonhousing construction sectors. This
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category also includes investment grants to these sectors. The regression results are in Table 
B11. Since the values for the vulnerability of this sector is distributed on a very large scale, 
the sample restriction is even very large. The sample is restricted between -10 and 12.5.
Political democracy has an ambiguous effect. This variable takes both a positive and a 
negative sign in regressions. However, its effect is insignificant in both directions. This 
finding is different from other produetive sector result, agriculture and forestry. The 
vulnerability of this sector is insensitive to the level of democraey. In order to test politieal 
stability, Barro’s index is used. All the values are positive and significant. Higher levels of 
political instability leads to higher vulnerable variables for this sector. The approaeh of the 
ruling elite is very different for two productive sectors. Under unstable regimes, politicians 
cut more of these expenditures. However, this result may be explained as follows: In an 
unstable environment, politicians are concerned about the policies, whose results can be 
seen in the short term. Manufacturing and construction projects have results in the long 
term. Thus, this expenditure eategory may be the easiest category. The absence of such 
projects are not understood by the public in the short run. Hence, the politicians may lose 
votes, due to lack of such projects. The economic ideology variable has a negative and 
significant coefficient. This variable is consistent with previous findings and with our 
expectations. Conservative right wing parties give more importanee to economic 
development and, in such an environment, the manufacturing sector is protected more. The 
variable indicating whether there is a war or a possibility of war has negative sign in 
regressions. In such a case, this sector is protected more in order to decrease the dependency 
of foreign goods. The relative size of state and local government has taken both negative 
and positive signs. The significant coefficient has negative value. This result is also
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consistent with the previous work .^ If there are developed local governments, 
manufacturing, mining and materials expenditures are more protected. It can be explained, 
if effective local governments perform other duties in a better way, this will decrease the 
burden of central government in the social sector and central government can engage in 
larger projects such as damps and factory constructions. The percentage decline in real total 
government expenditure has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Under any 
real budget cut, this sector is protected. A possible explanation for this is that the projects 
which are in process cannot be stopped at the beginning of any fiscal adjustment program. 
The cost of giving up a project may be higher than the cost of continuing the project. In that 
sense, vulnerability may be very small.
There are also many nonpolitical variables. Also, the effects of these nonpolitical 
variables will be discussed. Share of labor in industrial sectors, agricultural output as a 
percentage of total output, industrial output as a percentage of total output, and dependency 
ratio have negative significant relations. If these variables are high within a country, then it 
is reasonable to expect that this sector will be less vulnerable. Real per capita GNP has also 
a negative significant variable. Central government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP 
and foreign debt as a percentage of total expenditure have a positive impact on 
vulnerability. The latter is also significant. As (he foreign debt increases, the vulnerability 
will increase. This relation may be due to the dependency of industry upon the import of 
raw materials or intermediate goods or machines.
’ S ee  Fardm anesh and H abibi (1 9 9 7 ) , page 21
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3.4.2.12. Transportation and Communication:
The share of expenditure on transport and communications is closely related to the 
demands of an urban population. Also, some new investment in technology makes this 
expenditure very essential. The regression results can be seen in Table B12. The sample is 
restricted between -5 and 7 .
The political liberty variable is insignificant in that regression model. Thus, its sign is not 
important. Here, it is positive for the first three regressions and it is negative for the last two 
regressions. This expenditure category is insensitive to the level of democracy. The political 
instability variable has also different signs. It is positive and insignificant for three 
regressions, it is negative and significant for two regressions. If the political environment is 
highly unstable, then, the vulnerability will be less. However, it is difficult to say something 
definitely on this expenditure. Economic ideology variable is negatively correlated to the 
vulnerability of this sector. Transportation and communication expenditures are protected 
more under conservative regimes. Border tension variable has a negative and significant 
impact on vulnerability. The variable used for testing is in the reverse order. Thus, if there 
is a possibility of war, then vulnerability will increase. The relative size of local government 
is negatively correlated to the dependent variable and is significant. Again, some local roads 
can be built by local governments and the degree of financial eligibility helps central 
government to decide on the vulnerability of this expenditure category. However, 
vulnerability will be less because of the new technological improvements. The cost of such 
technological projects are much higher than the budget of a local government. The 
percentage decline in real total government expenditure has an insignificant effect. 
Average population growth rate has a negative and significant effect. This result is
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reasonable. This expenditure category is highly affected by the urban population* and the 
population growth rate is higher in urban areas. Thus, with increasing population growth, 
vulnerability will be less. The following macroeconomic variables have positive and 
significant variables; overall deficit as a percentage of GDP, industrial output as a 
percentage of total output, domestic debt as a percentage of total expenditure and 
dependency ratio. With the higher value of any of them, vulnerability will be higher for 
transportation and communication expenditures. For example, if there is an increase in 
overall deficit and in domestic debt, then the vulnerability will be higher in order to reduce 
deficit. If industrial output as a percentage of total output increases, then this means that 
there is less population in urban areas and the vulnerability will be higher. With a higher 
dependency ratio, a higher vulnerability will be observed, because of different priorities of 
this part of the population. Real per capita GNP has a negative significant coefficient. 
Higher levels of per capita income is associated with lower values of vulnerability. Foreign 
debt as a percentage of total expenditure is negatively and significantly correlated to the 
vulnerability of transportation and communication expenditures. Communication 
technology is usually imported. There may be a relation between foreign debt and 
vulnerability of this expenditure.
3.4.2.13. Other Economic Affairs and Expenditures:
Outlays on economic services tend to be largely for investment in most developing 
countries, though current outlays on operations and maintenance and economic regulatory
® See Heller and Diamond (1990).
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activities may also be important.’ The results of regressions are in Table B13. The sample of 
independent variable is restricted to -2.5 and 4.5.
Political democracy variable is positively correlated to the dependent variable. Under 
dictatorship, vulnerability will be higher. In this model, in order to test political instability, 
Gupta’s index is used. It gave better results than Barro’s index. Political instability has a 
negative and significant effect on the dependent variable. It is again a consistent result with 
our previous findings. Under unstable environments, investment and maintenance 
expenditures are cut. Economic ideology has mostly negative effect. The negative sign of 
this coefficient indicates that under a right wing regime the economic affairs sector is more 
protected.” Border tension variable has a negative and significant effect. This sector is 
more protected under such a possibility. Of course, the investment area is also important. 
The relative size of government has a positive significant relation. If the investments and 
economic regulatory activities are done by local governments, vulnerability will be higher. 
The percentage decline in real total government expenditure does not give enough evidence 
to comment on this variable. It is not significant and has an ambiguous effect on the 
dependent variable.
Other variables are as follows: industrial output as a percentage of total output, overall 
deficit as a percentage of GDP, and total expenditure as a percentage of GDP. All these 
variables are negatively related to the independent variable and are significant. If higher 
values will be observed for any of these variables, then lower values will be observed for the 
vulnerability of this sector.
’ S ee  H eller  and D iam on d  (1 9 9 0 ) .
S ee  Fardm anesh and H abib i (1 9 9 7 ) .
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3.4.2.14. Other Expenditures:
This expenditure category is the second component of the miscellaneous expenditure. 
The regression results are in Table B14. The sample is restricted between -5 and 7.
Political democracy has a positive and significant impact on the vulnerability of this 
expenditure category. In a nondemocratic environment, vulnerability will be higher and this 
sector will be protected less.
For this category, Barro’s index is used in order to test political instability. This relation 
is negative. Under unstable environments, this sector is protected. Economic ideology is 
negatively related. This negative coefficient indicates that under a right wing regime, this 
sector is more protected, which measures arbitrariness and lack of discipline in government 
expenditure".
The war or border tension indicator is tested by using different variables. Country at war 
variable is a dummy variable showing whether a country is or not at war. Border tension 
variable can take three different values showing the degree of border tension. The war 
variable and the border tension variable have positive and significant effects. The 
vulnerabilities will increase during war or in emergency situations.
The relative size of government is not significant for the regression results. The 
percentage decline in real total government expenditures positively correlated. In situations, 
in which there will be a real decline in government expenditures, the vulnerability will be 
higher.
S ee  Fardm anesh and H abibi (1 9 9 7 ) , page 2 0
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There are also other variables tested in regression models. Agricultural output as a 
percentage of total output, industrial output as a percentage of total output and real per 
capita GNP have positive and significant variables. The vulnerability will be high if any of 
them is higher. Domestic debt as a percentage of total expenditure and average population 
growth rate are negatively correlated and they are statistically significant. Higher population 
growth rate is associated with less vulnerability on this expenditure.
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4. CONCLUSION
In this study, our aim is to investigate whether there is a relation between the political 
environment of a country and the vulnerability of expenditure programs during periods of 
budget cuts. The regression analysis is performed by using cross country data.
The flndings can be summarized as follows:
1. Economic ideology has positive and significant effects on the vulnerability of general 
public services, public order and safety, social security and welfare, other community and 
social expenditure sectors. It has negative and significant effects on the vulnerability of 
health, mining, materials and manufacturing, transportation and communication, fuel and 
energy, agricultural and forestry, and other expenditures. In other sectors such as defense, 
education, housing and community amenities and other economic affairs it does not have 
any significant effect.
2. Political liberty variable is also effective for determining the vulnerability of some 
sectors. If we summarize them, political liberty has positive and significant effects on 
housing and community amenities, fuel and energy, other economic affairs and other 
expenditures. It has negative and significant effects on public order and safety, education, 
social security and welfare, agriculture and forestry, other community and social services. 
The effect of political liberty is insignificant on mining, materials, and manufacturing, 
transportation and communication, general public services, defense and health expenditure.
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3. Political instability has significant effects all the time. It is positively related to fuel 
and energy, mining, materials and manufacturing, health, agriculture and forestry. In high 
unstable political environments, these sectors are not protected. All the other sectors are 
negatively correlated and they are protected.
4. The relative size of local government is also an important political factor. This 
variable is negatively and significantly related to fuel and energy, mining, materials, and 
manufacturing, transportation and communication and other expenditures. Actually those 
sectors have a common property. Their related projects should be nationwide. Thus, even 
during fiscal adjustment programs, they are protected. All the other sectors are positively 
related and with effective and larger local governments, vulnerabilities will be higher.
5. The percentage decline in real total government expenditures is also an important 
variable to decide the vulnerability of the sectors. It has a negative and significant relation to 
general public services, fuel and energy, agriculture and forestry and mining, materials and 
manufacturing expenditures. These sectors are protected more under budget cuts. It has a 
negative but insignificant effect on the defense, other economic affairs and housing and 
community amenities. Only two sectors are positively and significantly related. These 
sectors are health and public order and safety. These sectors are not protected during a 
budget cut. The other sectors are positively and insignificantly related.
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6. The war indicator or the index of border tension is also an important factor at 
determining the vulnerability of expenditure sectors. It is significant all the time.
Except for these variables, there are also some economic and social variables, whieh are 
specific to each expenditure seetor.
The aim for this study was to analyze the budget cuts systematically and to see any 
statistical regularity between the vulnerability of each sector and political variables. We 
arrived at some meaningful and interpretable results. Most of the results are consistent with 
our expectations. We tried to explain some unusual results. Finally, this study provides a 
better understanding of budgetary outcome during fiscal adjustment programs.
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TABLE A l: Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(-5,5)' Sample A^ Sample B'’ Sample
General Public Serv. 0.47 (116)^ 0.37 (70) 0.64 (46)
Defense 0.49 (110) 0.42 (69) 0.61 (41)
Public Order & Safety -0.13 (33) -0.69' (21) 0.83 (12)
Education 0.43 (123) 0.45 (76) 0.39 (47)
Health 0.47 (110) 0.28 (65) 0.74 (45)
Social Sec. & Welf 0.54 (103) 0.54 (64) 0.55 (39)
Housing & Com. A. 1.10 (81) 0.76 (45) 1.53 (36)
Recreation & Culture 0.50 (99) 0.26 (59) 0.86 (46)
Fuel & Energy 1.08 (56) 1.05 (30) 1.11 (26)
Agriculture & Forest. 0.87 (89) 0.85 (48) 0.90 (41)
Min., Manuf & Cons. 0.95 (66) 1.28 (36) 0.55 (30)
Transport. & Comm. 1.12 (98) 1.01 (56) 1.26 (42)
Other Economic Aff. 0.67 (84) 0.08 (45) 1.34 (39)
Other Expenditures 0.51 (106) 0.35 (65) 0.76 (41)
'Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation of the averages.
“Sample A contains the whole sample.
^Sample B is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less than 
the median value for Sample A.
''Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government is larger than the 
median value for Sample A.
^Number o f observations.
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TABLE A2: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(-5,5)' Sample A^ Sample B^ Sample
GPS  ^& Defense 0.043 0.002 0.173
GPS & Public Order and Safety 0.180 0.245 -0.094
GPS & Education 0.180 0.175 0.244
GPS& Health 0.138 0.244 -0.185
GPS & Social Security - Welfare -0.100 -0.121 -0.051
GPS & Housing - Comm. Amen. 0.030 -0.041 0.203
GPS & Recreation - Culture 0.071 0.046 0.092
GPS & Fuel - Energy -0.053 -0.220 0.250
GPS & Agriculture - Forestry 0.155 0.152 0.126
GPS & Mining- Manuf - Const. -0.036 -0.079 0.115
GPS & Transport - Commun. -0.053 -0.103 0.152
GPS & Other Econ. Affairs 0.020 -0.083 0.157
GPS & Other Expenditures -0.095 0.012 -0.383
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
- Sample A includes the whole sample.
 ^ Sample B is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample A.
■' Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample A.
' General Public Services.
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TABLE A2: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(-5,5)' Sample A^ Sample B^ Sample C*
Defense & Public Order and Safety 0.147 -0.064 0.642
Defense & Education 0.074 0.040 0.310
Defense & Health 0.231 0.237 0.256
Defense & Social Sec. - Welfare 0.044 0.060 -0.030
Defense & Hous. - Comm. Amen. 0.110 0.025 0.357
Defense & Recreation - Culture 0.137 0.099 0.256
Defense & Fuel - Energy -0.156 -0.109 -0.286
Defense & Agriculture - Forestry -0.055 -0.039 -0.125
Defense & Mining-Manuf - Const. -0.002 -0.110 0.115
Defense & Transport - Commun. 0.295 0.335 0.099
Defense & Other Econ. Affairs 0.058 -0.029 0.341
Defense & Other Expenditures -0.265 -0.248 -0.333
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
■ Sample A includes the whole sample.
’ Sample B is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample A.
·' Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample A.
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TABLE A2: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(-5.5)' Sample A^ Sample B^ Sample C*
Public Order and Safety & 
Education 
Public Order and Safety & 
Health
Public Order and Safety & Social 
Security - Welfare 
Public Order and Safety &
Plousing - Comm. Amen.
Public Order and Safety &
Recreation - Culture 
Public Order and Safety & Fuel - 
Energy
Public Order and Safety &
Agriculture - Forestry 
Public Order and Safety &
Mining- Manuf - Const.
Public Order and Safety &
Transport - Commun.
Public Order and Safety & Other 
Econ. Affairs
Public Order and Safety & Other 
Expenditures
0.199 0.230 0.141
0.115 -0.073 0.469
0.221 0.047 0.662
-0.044 -0.202 0.472
0.366 0.287 0.630
-0.137 -0.302 0.308
0.328 0.360 0.282
0.307 0.312 0.206
0.179 0.413 -0.219
0.128 0.211 -0.218
-0.294 -0.124 -0.650
‘ Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
- Sample A includes the whole sample.
’ Sample B is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample A.
“ Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample A.
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TABLE A2: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(-5,5)' Sample A^ Sample B^ Sample C“*
Education & Health 0.399 0.400 0.442
Education & Social Security - 
Welfare
0.192 0.192 0.229
Education & Housing - Comm. 
Amen.
-0.131 -0.215 0.114
Education & Recreation - Culture 0.312 0.350 0.157
Education & Fuel - Energy -0.188 -0.104 -0.412
Education & Agriculture - Forestry 0.291 0.356 0.067
Education & Mining- Manuf - Const. -0.142 -0.155 -0.257
Education & Transport - Commun. 0.281 0.305 0.175
Education & Other Econ. Affairs 0.048 0.070 0.013
Education & Other Expenditures -0.391 -0.389 -0.437
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
■ Sample A includes the whole sample.
 ^ Sample B is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample A.
Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample A.
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TABLE A2: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
Sample A^ Sample B^ _____ Sample
Health & Social Security - 
Welfare
Health & Housing - Comm.
Amen.
Health & Recreation - Culture 
Health & Fuel - Energy 
Health & Agriculture - Forestry 
Health & Mining- Manuf - Const. 
Health & Transport - Commun. 
Health & Other Econ. Affairs 
Health & Other Expenditures
0.212 0.200 0.255
-0.231 -0.295 -0.183
0.340 0.315 0.330
0.049 0.120 -0.127
0.155 0.195 -0.119
0.080 0.253 -0.074
-0.003 -0.077 0.252
0.134 0.101 0.118
-0.366 -0.395 -0.410
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
- Sample A includes the whole sample.
’ Sample B is a subsample o f Saample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample A.
■· Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample A.
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TABLE A2: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
Sample A^ Sample B^ Sample
Social Security - Welfare & 
Housing - Comm. Amen.
Social Security - Welfare & 
Recreation - Culture 
Social Security - Welfare & 
Fuel - Energy
Social Security - Welfare & 
Agriculture - Forestry 
Social Security - Welfare & 
Mining- Manuf - Const.
Social Security - Welfare & 
Transport - Commun.
Social Security - Welfare & 
Other Econ. Affairs 
Social Security - Welfare & 
Other Expenditures__________
0.130
0.058
-0.235
0.171
-0.039
0.108
0.151
-0.135
0.070
- 0.0002
-0.186
0.227
-0.142
0.126
0.252
-0.047
0.181
0.184
-0.304
-0.034
-0.184
0.058
- 0.111
-0.406
Housing - Comm. Amen & 
Recreation - Culture
-0.042 -0.0017 -0.193
Housing - Comm. Amen & 
Fuel - Energy
-0.041 0.105 -0.241
Housing - Comm. Amen & 
Agriculture - Forestry
0.123 0.075 0.177
Housing - Comm. Amen & 
Mining-Manuf-Construetion
0.240 0.229 0.296
Housing - Comm. Amen & 
Transport - Commun.
0.007 -0.088 0.239
Housing - Comm. Amen & 
Other Econ. Affairs
0.103 0.075 0.065
Housing - Comm. Amen & 
Other Expenditures
-0.029 0.055 -0.226
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
- Sample A includes the whole sample.
' Sample B is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample A.
Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample A.
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TABLE A2: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(-5,5)'_________________________ Sample A^ Sample B'’ Sample C^
Recreation - Culture & Fuel - -0.031 -0.067 0.036
Energy
Recreation - Culture & Agriculture - 0.104 0.058 0.224
Forestry
Recreation - Culture & Mining- 
Manuf - Const.
0.062 -0.043 0.265
Recreation - Culture & Transport - 
Commun.
0.091 0.118 -0.018
Recreation - Culture & Other Econ. 0.027 -0.062 0.135
Affairs
Recreation - Culture & Other 
Expenditure
0.282 -0.180 -0.498
Fuel - Energy & 
Forestry
Agriculture - 0.039 -0.034 0.180
Fuel - Energy & Mining- Manuf- 
Construction
0.103 0.223 -0.048
Fuel - Energy & 
Commun.
Transport - -0.004 -0.078 0.283
Fuel - Energy & 
Affairs
Other Econ. 0.109 0.071 0.147
Fuel - Energy & Other Expenditures 0.023 0.028 -0.034
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
' Sample A includes the whole sample.
’ Sample B is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample A.
“ Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample A.
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TABLE A2: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(-5,5)'_______________ Sample A^ Sample B^ Sample C*
Agriculture - Forestry 
Manuf - Const.
& Mining- -0.026 0.030 -0.114
Agriculture - Forestry & 
Commun.
Transport - 0.108 0.109 0.092
Agriculture - Forestry & 
Affairs
Other Econ. -0.015 -0.099 0.134
Agriculture - Forestry 
Expenditures
& Other -0.195 -0.215 -0.150
Mining- Manuf- Construction & -0.081 -0.100 -0.007
Transport - Commun.
Mining- Manuf- 
Other Econ. Affairs
Construction & 0.171 0.173 0.242
Mining- Manuf- 
Other Expenditures
Construction & -0.199 -0.076 -0.331
Transport Commun. & Other 0.020 -0.111 0.229
Economic Affairs - Services
Transport
Expenditures
Commun. & Other -0.346 -0.389 -0.282
Other Econ. Affairs & Other 
Expenditures
0.166 0.281 0.022
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
- Sample A includes the whole sample.
’ Sample B is a subsample of Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample A.
' Sample C is a subsample o f Sample A for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample A.
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TABLE A3: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
10^ Sample Sample Sample F**
GPS  ^& Defense
GPS & Public Order and 
Safety
GPS & Education 
GPS & Health
GPS & Social Security - 
Welfare
GPS & Housing - Comm. 
Amen.
GPS & Recreation - Culture
GPS & Fuel - Energy
GPS & Agriculture - Forestry
GPS & Mining- Manuf - 
Const.
GPS & Transport - Commun. 
GPS & Other Econ. Affairs 
GPS & Other Expenditure
0.319
0.302
0.337
0.214
0.497
0.203
0.190
0.194
0.445
-0.197
0.137
0.067
0.268
0.195
0.574
0.298
0.177
0.550
0.308
0.176
-0.056
0.464
-0.272
0.178
0.097
0.189
0.242
0.215
0.009
- 0.221
0.284
-0.326
- 0.121
0.487
0.070
-0.361
-0.123
0.185
0.277
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
- Sample D includes the whole sample.
’ Sample E is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample D.
' Sample F is a subsample of Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample D.
' General Public Services.
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TABLE A3: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(0,5)' Sample Sample _____ Sample
Defense & Public Order and 
Safety
Defense & Education
Defense & Health
Defense & Social Security - 
Welfare
Defense & Housing - Comm. 
Amen.
Defense & Recreation - Culture
Defense & Fuel - Energy
Defense & Agriculture - Forestry
Defense & Mining- Manuf - 
Const.
Defense & Transport - Commun. 
Defense & Other Econ. Affairs 
Defense & Other Expenditures
0.598 0.527 0.650
0.209 0.066 0.443
0.341 0.193 0.238
0.687 0.690 0.674
0.162 0.073 0.334
0.252 0.217 0.253
-0.207 0.291 0.164
0.372 0.352 0.020
-0.201 -0.472 0.228
0.323 0.312 -0.154
0.041 0.061 0.130
0.150 0.288 -0.057
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
-  Sample D includes the whole sample.
 ^ Sample E is a subsample of Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample D.
'* Sample F is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample D.
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TABLE A3: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
10^ Sample Sample _____ Sample
Public Order and Safety & 
Education
Public Order and Safety & Health
Public Order and Safety & Social 
Security - Welfare 
Public Order and Safety &
Housing - Comm. Amen.
Public Order and Safety &
Recreation - Culture
Public Order and Safety & Fuel -
Energy
Public Order and Safety &
Agriculture - Forestry 
Public Order and Safety & Mining- 
Manuf - Const.
Public Order and Safety &
Transport - Commun.
Public Order and Safety & Other 
Econ. Affairs
Public Order and Safety & Other 
Expenditures
0.821 0.860 0.900
0.095 0.342 0.044
0.221 0.468 0.215
-0.016 -0.655 1.000
0.744 0.660 0.949
0.151 -0.009 1.000
0.454 0.922 0.070
0.375 0.081 0.050
0.626 0.673 0.726
0.380 0.898 -0.006
-0.026 0.125 -0.994
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
■ Sample D includes the whole sample.
' Sample E is a subsample of Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample D.
Sample F is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample D.
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TABLE A3: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
Sample _____Sample _____ Sample
Education & Health
Education & Social Security - 
Welfare
Education & Housing - Comm. 
Amen.
Education & Recreation - Culture
Education & Fuel - Energy
Education & Agriculture - Forestry
Education & Mining- Manuf - 
Const.
Education & Transport - Commun. 
Education & Other Econ. Affairs 
Education & Other Expenditures
0.136 -0.028 0.395
0.143 0.024 0.324
0.006 -0.102 0.156
0.326 0.390 0.158
-0.226 -0.388 -0.010
0.319 0.227 -0.047
-0.051 -0.135 -0.095
0.238 0.197 0.123
0.234 0.523 -0.002
0.044 0.166 -0.304
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
■ Sample D includes the whole sample.
 ^ Sample E is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample D.
“ Sample F is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample D.
6 0
TABLE A3: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(0,5)' Sample Sample E'’ Sample F“*
Health & Social Security - Welfare 0.343 0.292 -0.100
Health & Housing - Comm. Amen. -0.054 -0.189 0.129
Health & Recreation - Culture 0.035 -0.022 -0.110
Health & Fuel - Energy -0.012 0.055 -0.200
Health & Agriculture - Forestry 0.275 0.259 -0.009
Health & Mining- Manuf - Const. -0.094 -0.141 -0.116
Health & Transport - Common. 0.340 0.240 0.346
Health & Other Econ. Affairs 0.224 0.281 0.296
Health & Other Expenditures 0.060 0.072 -0.228
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
" Sample D includes the whole sample.
 ^ Sample E is a subsample of Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median valeu for Sample D.
■* Sample F is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample D.
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TABLE A3: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
Sample Sample ____ Sample F**
Social Security - Welfare &
Housing- Comm. Amen.
Social Security - Welfare &
Recreation - Culture 
Social Security - Welfare & Fuel - 
Energy
Social Security - Welfare &
Agriculture - Forestry 
Social Security - Welfare & Mining- 
Manuf - Const.
Social Security - Welfare &
Transport - Commun.
Social Security - Welfare & Other 
Econ. Affairs
Social Security - Welfare & Other 
Fixpenditures
0.130 -0.148 0.388
-0.024 0.003 -0.109
-0.020 0.142 -0.086
0.180 0.102 0.029
-0.191 -0.414 0.038
0.343 0.443 0.179
0.291 0.357 0.234
0.050 0.012 0.200
Flousing - Comm. 
Recreation - Culture
Amen & -0.116 -0.027 -0.190
Housing - Comm. Amen & Fuel - 0.017 -0.103 0.206
Energy
Housing - Comm. Amen & 0.021 0.034 -0.061
Agriculture - Forestry 
Housing - Comm. Amen & Mining- 0.348 0.261 0.419
Manufacturing- Construction
Housing - Comm. 
Transport - Commun.
Amen & 0.142 -0.054 0.270
Housing - Comm. Amen 
Econ. Affairs
& Other -0.108 -0.249 -0.002
Housing - Comm. Amen 
Expenditures
& Other 0.049 0.071 -0.185
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation o f the averages.
■ Sample D includes the whole sample.
 ^ Sample E is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample D.
Sample F is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample D.
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TABLE A3: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(0,5)' Sample Sample Sample F‘*
Recreation - Culture & Fuel - 
Energy
Recreation - Culture &
Agriculture - Forestry 
Recreation - Culture &
Mining- Manuf - Const. 
Recreation - Culture &
Transport - Commun. 
Recreation - Culture & Other 
Econ. Affairs
Recreation - Culture & Other 
Expenditures_______________
0.080 -0.006 0.237
0.116 -0.030 0.434
0.284 -0.468 -0.108
0.019 -0.054 -0.071
0.281 0.291 0.319
-0.152 -0.011 -0.544
Fuel - Energy & Agriculture - 
Forestry
Fuel - Energy & Mining-
Manuf- Construction
Fuel - Energy & Transport -
Commun.
Fuel - Energy & Other Econ. 
Affairs
Fuel - Energy & Other 
Expenditures
0.467 0.379 0.576
0.013 -0.194 0.348
0.153 -0.089 0.643
-0.163 -0.179 -0.261
-0.316 -0.191 -0.474
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation of the averages.
- Sample D includes the whole sample.
 ^ Sample E is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample D.
 ^Sample F is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample D.
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TABLE A3: Correlation Between Sectoral Vulnerabilities
(0,5)' Sample Sample Sample
Agriculture - Forestry & Mining- 
Manuf - Const.
0.003 -0.110 -0.213
Agriculture - Forestry & 
Transport - Commun.
0.369 0.341 0.417
Agriculture - Forestry & Other 
Econ. Affairs
0.279 0.286 0.301
Agriculture - Forestry & Other 
Expenditures
-0.052 0.171 -0.335
Mining- Manuf- Construction & -0.005 -0.261 0.282
Transport - Commun.
Mining- Manuf- Construction & 
Other Econ. Affairs
-0.467 -0.478 -0.535
Mining- Manuf- Construction & 
Other Expenditures
-0.246 -0.428 -0.104
Transport - Commun. & Other 0.199 0.252 0.246
Economic Affairs - Services
Transport - Commun. & Other -0.070 -0.040 -0.157
Expenditures
Other Econ. Affairs & Other 
Expenditures
0.043 0.203 -0.166
' Vulnerabilities values within this range have been used in calculation of the averages.
- Sample D includes the whole sample.
’ Sample E is a subsample of Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is less 
than the median value for Sample D.
 ^ Sample F is a subsample o f Sample D for which the reduction in total government expenditure is larger 
than the median o f Sample D.
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TABLE A4: Average Value of Vulnerabilities For Different Levels o f Political
Democracy
r-5,51' Democratic Semidemocratic Nondemocratic
General Public Serv. 0.11 (21)- 
(2.16)-^
0.44 (61) 
(1.57)
0.76 (34) 
(2.05)
Defense 0.68 (22) 
(1.38)
0.32 (55) 
(1.79)
0.66 (33) 
(1.57)
Public Order & Safety -1.21 (7) 
(2.28)
-0.06 (18) 
(2.07)
0.65 (8) 
(2.43)
Education 0.42 (23) 
(1.12)
0.48 (66) 
(1.83)
0.33 (34) 
(1.76)
Health 0.12 (20) 
(1.15)
0.61 (55) 
(1.54)
0.46 (35) 
(1.86)
Social Security & Wei. 0.24 (22) 
(1.08)
0.51 (55) 
(1.44)
0.87 (26) 
(1.74)
Housing & Com. A. 1.78 (15) 
(2.51)
0.71 (43) 
(2.03)
1.40 (23) 
(2.17)
Recreation & Culture 0.29 (21) 
(2.71)
0.37 (51) 
(2.29)
0.90 (27) 
(1.74)
Fuel & Energy 1.42 (10) 
(2.31)
1.07 (27) 
(2.47)
0.91 (19) 
(2.73)
Agriculture & Forest. 0.61 (15) 
(2.53)
0.93 (47) 
(1.81)
0.92 (27) 
(1.99)
Min., Manuf & Cons. 0.71 (9) 
(2.90)
0.43 (37) 
(2.02)
2.03 (20) 
(2.00)
Transport. & Comm. 1.13 (22) 
(2.02)
0.95 (47) 
(2.23)
1.38 (29) 
(2.01)
Other Economic Aff. 0.34 (14) 
(2.03)
0.41 (47) 
(2.87)
1.40 (23) 
(2.09)
Other Expenditures 0.80 (24) 
(1.22)
0.55 (54) 
(2.45)
0.18 (28) 
(2.30)
' V u ln erab ilities w ith in  th is range are u sed  in ca lcu lation  o f  the averages.
- N u m b er o f  ob servation s.
 ^ Standard d ev ia tion .
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TABLE A4: Average Value of Vulnerabilities For Different Levels of Politieal
Democracy
rO,5T Democratic Semidemocratic Nondemocratic
General Publie Serv. 1.41 (13)- 
(1.15)·’
1.30 (40) 
(0.96)
1.67 (25) 
(1.30)
Defense 1.27 (16) 
(1.10)
1.33 (35) 
(1.17)
1.32 (26) 
(0.89)
Public Order & Safety 1.08 (14) 
(0.86)
1.33 (46) 
(1.25)
2.11 (5) 
(1.32)
Education 1.08 (14) 
(0.86)
1.33 (46) 
(1.25)
1.38 (22) 
(0.82)
Health 0.89 (11) 
(0.75)
1.44 (35) 
(1.22)
1.68 (21) 
(1.00)
Social Security & Wei. 0.87 (14) 
(0.73)
1.29 (36) 
(1.04)
1.62 (19) 
(1.25)
Housing & Com. A. 3.05 (11) 
(1.35)
1.59 (33) 
(1.13)
1.42 (17) 
(1.38)
Recreation & Culture 1.92 (14) 
(1.38)
1.99 (30) 
(1.14)
1.52 (22) 
(1.13)
Fuel & Energy 2.14 (8) 
(1.87)
2.30 (19) 
(1.52)
2.31 (14) 
(1.22)
Agriculture & Forest. 1.83 (11) 
(1.37)
1.82 (33) 
(1.33)
1.92 (19) 
(1.38)
Min., Manuf. & Cons. 2.49 (6) 
(1.24)
1.60 (24) 
(1.07)
2.59 (17) 
(1.57)
Transport. & Comm. 2.17 (16) 
(0.92)
2.04 (34) 
(1.30)
2.12 (24) 
(1.06)
Other Economic Aff. 1.80 (8) 
(0.82)
2.58 (27) 
(1.16)
2.27 (18) 
(1.32)
Other Expenditures 1.91 (17) 
(1.33)
2.13 (34) 
(0.97)
2.04 (14) 
(1.46)
' V u ln erab ilities w ith in  th is range are used  in ca lcu lation  o f  the averages.
- N u m b er o f  ob servation .
 ^ Standard d ev ia tion .
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TABLE A5: Average Value of Vulnerabilities For Different Levels o f Political
Stability
(-5,5)' Stable Semistable Unstable
General Public Serv. 0.31 (25)- 
(2.15)·’
0.55 (60) 
(1.76)
0.87 (11) 
(1.97)
Defense 0.58 (26) 
(1.94)
0.56 (56) 
(1.72)
0.12 (7) 
(0.97)
Public Order & Safety -0.96 (10) 
(2.37)
-0.63 (11) 
(2.23)
0.62 (6) 
(1.66)
Education 0.98 (25) 
(1.36)
0.02 (64) 
(1.90)
0.76 (12) 
(1.45)
Health 0.53 (20) 
(1.63)
0.481 (57) 
(1.75)
-0.01 (12) 
(1.17)
Social Security & Wei. 0.18 (26) 
(1.45)
0.56 (52) 
(1.48)
0.60 (11) 
(0.77)
Housing & Com. A. 1.32 (16) 
(1.91)
1.42 (42) 
(2.06)
0.17 (9) 
(2.61)
Recreation & Culture 0.54 (21) 
(2.73)
0.47 (47) 
(2.33)
0.47 (11) 
(2.00)
Fuel & Energy 0.70 (10) 
(2.09)
0.92 (27) 
(2.53)
0.36 (7) 
(2.84)
Agriculture & Forest. 0.41 (15) 
(2.44)
1.16 (46) 
(1.87)
1.34 (9) 
(1.81)
Min., Manuf. & Cons. 1.23 (10) 
(2.24)
0.55 (37) 
(2.40)
1.04 (8) 
(1.85)
Transport. & Comm. 0.79 (21) 
(2.05)
1.26 (49) 
(2.21)
1.05 (12) 
(2.33)
Other Economic Aff. 0.16 (19) 
(2.67)
0.65 (40) 
(2.67)
1.09 (8) 
(2.62)
Other Expenditures 0.41 (29) 
(2.60)
0.29 (47) 
(2.48)
1.63 (11) 
(1.61)
' V u ln erab ilities w ith in  th is range are used  in ca lcu lation  o f  the averages.
■ N um ber o f  ob servation s.
’ Standard d ev ia tion .
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TABLE A5: Average Value of Vulnerabilities For Different Levels o f Political
Stability
(0,5)' Stable Semistable Unstable
General Public Serv. 1.37 (18)- 
(1.03)·'
1.46 (40) 
(1.17)
1.56 (9) 
(1.12)
Defense 1.54 (18) 
(1.16)
1.39 (40) 
(1.10)
0.78 (4) 
(0.52)
Public Order & Safety 1.61 (3) 
(1.74)
1.42 (5) 
(1.29)
1.90 (3) 
(1.40)
Education 1.50 (18) 
(1.24)
1.22 (38) 
(1.05)
1.22 (9) 
(1.35)
Health 1.61 (11) 
(1.31)
1.49 (36) 
(1.17)
0.98 (6) 
(0.72)
Social Security & Wei. 1.15 (15) 
(1.80)
1.29 (35) 
(1.18)
0.86 (9) 
(0.57)
Housing & Com. A. 1.92 (13) 
(1.55)
2.11 (35) 
(1.39)
2.07 (5) 
(0.86)
Recreation & Culture 2.19 (14) 
(1.41)
1.96 (30) 
(1.04)
1.65 (7) 
(1.44)
Fuel & Energy 1.60 (7) 
(1.62)
2.43 (18) 
(1.30)
1.49 (5) 
(1.89)
Agriculture & Forest. 1.83 (10) 
(1.13)
1.93 (35) 
(1.37)
1.69 (8) 
(1.57)
Min., Manuf & Cons. 2.09 (8) 
(1.38)
1.96 (24) 
(1.42)
1.86 (6) 
(1.16)
Transport. & Comm. 2.00 (14) 
(1.00)
2.16 (39) 
(1.23)
2.07 (9) 
(1.23)
Other Economic Aff. 2.19 (11) 
(0.94)
2.46 (24) 
(1.26)
2.76 (5) 
(1.58)
Other Expenditures 1.93 (19) 
(1.34)
2.35 (24) 
(1.19)
2.43 (8) 
(0.98)
' V u ln erab ilities w ith in  th is range are used  in ca lcu la tion  o f  the averages.
- N um ber o f  ob servation s.
' Standard d ev ia tion .
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TABLE A6: Average Value of Vulnerabilities on Different Continents
(-5,5)' Latin America Asia Africa Europe
General Public 
Services
0.58 (32)' 
(1.68)'
1.06 (33) 
(1.76)
0.28 (31) 
(1.43)
-0.37 (20) 
(2.39)
Defense 0.18 (30) 
(1.80)
0.41 (31) 
(1.52)
0.85 (29) 
(1.82)
0.57 (20) 
(1.30)
Public Order and 
Safety
-0.92 (8) 
(1.71)
1.21 (10) 
(2.41)
-0.08 (8) 
(1.82)
-1.21 (7) 
(2.28)
Education 0.78 (35) 
(1.88)
0.42 (37) 
(1.92)
0.12 (34) 
(1.43)
0.33 (17) 
(1.13)
Health 0.40 (30) 
(1.60)
0.68 (33) 
(1.87)
0.58 (22) 
(1.43)
-0.10 (15) 
(1.12)
Social Security & 
Welfare
0.45 (32) 
(1.09)
0.64 (24) 
(1.22)
1.04 (28) 
(1.82)
-0.15 (19) 
(1.48)
Housing and Comm. 
Amenities
1.20 (23) 
(2.21)
1.03 (24) 
(2.10)
0.92 (21) 
(2.17)
1.35 (13) 
(2.52)
Recreation and 
Culture
1.35 (25) 
(2.13)
0.51 (30) 
(2.17)
0.21 (28) 
(1.96)
-0.35 (16) 
(2.72)
Fuel and Energy 1.12 (16) 
(2.39)
0.58 (20) 
(2.76)
1.79 (14) 
(2.58)
0.97 (6) 
(1.64)
Agriculture and 
Forestry
0.80 (27) 
(2.01)
0.87 (25) 
(2.18)
1.11 (28) 
(1.71)
0.34 (9) 
(2.30)
Mining, Manuf. & 
Construction
-0.17 (17) 
(1.83)
1.35 (18) 
(2.29)
1.18 (23) 
(2.27)
1.80 (8) 
(2.28)
Transportation & 
Communication
1.16 (31) 
(1.87)
0.99 (29) 
(2.32)
1.43 (23) 
(2.12)
0.78 (15) 
(2.28)
Other Econ. Affairs & 
Services
0.80 (26) 
(2.47)
0.70 (21) 
(2.73)
0.46 (24) 
(2.85)
0.74 (13) 
(2.20)
Other Expenditure 0.62 (28) 
(2.12)
-0.01 (25) 
(2.52)
0.43 (32) 
(2.42)
1.09 (21) 
(2.36)
' V u lnerab ility  v a lu es w ith in  this range have been  used in ca lcu la tion s o f  the averages.
 ^ N um ber o f  ob servation s.
 ^Standard d ev ia tion .
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TABLE A6: Average Value of Vulnerabilities on Different Continents
(0,5)' Latin America Asia Africa Europe
General Public Services
Defense
Public Order and Safety
Education
Health
Social Security & 
Welfare
Housing and Comm. 
Amenities
Recreation and Culture
Fuel and Energy 
Agriculture and Forestry
Mining, Manuf. & 
Construction
Transportation & 
Communication
Other Econ. Affairs & 
Services
Other Expenditures
1.27 (24)  ^
(1.09)·'
1.76 (25) 
(1.30)
1.21 (19) 
(0.73)
1.46 (10) 
(1.21)
1.15 (20) 
(1.15)
1.40 (19) 
(0.79)
1.54 (23) 
(1.26)
1.08 (15) 
(1.02)
0.73 (3) 
(0.60)
2.79 (6) 
1.54
1.45 (4) 
(0.54
0.76 (3) 
(0.60)
1.57 (26) 
(1.27)
1.50 (24) 
(1.14)
0.86 (22) 
(0.77)
1.05 (10) 
(0.77)
1.28 (20) 
(1.05)
2.11 (17) 
(1.24)
1.22 (23) 
(0.97)
0.82 (7) 
(0.63)
1.07 (22) 
(0.51)
1.10 (18) 
(0.99)
1.94 (19) 
(1.46)
0.91 (10) 
(0.79)
1.99 (18) 
(1.52)
1.89 (19) 
(1.25)
2.07 (15) 
(1.17)
2.72 (9) 
(1.52)
2.11 (21) 1.80 (19) 1.54 (17) 1.72 (9)
(1.16)
2.36 (11) 
(1.59)
1.74 (20)
( 1.22)
1.27 (9) 
(0.92)
1.18 (25) 
(0.99)
2.22 (17)
(1.22)
1.85 (18) 
(0.81)
(1.35)
2.29 (13) 
(1.03)
2.16 (16) 
(1.51)
2.06 (15) 
1.52
2.20 (21) 
(14)
2.18 (15) 
1.31
2.22 (12) 
(1.17)
(0.99)
2.61 (12) 
(1.63)
1.80 (21)
(1.39)
2.33 (16)
(1.40)
2.25 (18) 
(1.36)
2.81 (13) 
(1.14)
2.11 (19) 
(1.22)
(1.32)
1.23 (5) 
(1.69)
1.60 (6) 
(1.18)
2.51 (7) 
(1.14)
2.12 ( 10) 
(1.16)
2.26 (8) 
(0.92)
2.10 (16) 
(1.49)
' V u ln erab ility  v a lu es  w ith in  this range h ave  been  used  in ca lcu la tion s o f  the averages.
■ N um ber o f  o b servation s.
’ Standard d ev ia tion .
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TABLE B l: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f General Public Services
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5
% Decline in Real Total -0.044 -2.270 -2.277 -2.025 -1.708
Gov. Exp. (0.042) (0.226) (0.218) (0.258) (0.313)
State and Local Gov. Budget 0.220 0.260 0.277 0.037 -0.183
as % of Central Gov. Budget (0.776) (0.736) (0.713) (0.959) (0.791)
Economic Ideology 0.298 0.254 0.246 0.332 0.347
(0.167) (0.262) (0.250) (0.111) (0.079)
Political Democracy 0.035 -0.011
(0.731) (0.890)
Political Instability -0.286 -0.246 -0.348
(0.460) (0.456) (0.271)
ACR Index of Instability 0.125 0.125
(0.420) (0.415)
Central Gov. Budget Deficit -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
as % of GDP (0.084) (0.045) (0.040) (0.019) (0.013)
Average Population Growth 0.389 0.407 0.396 0.423 0.404
Rate (0.034) (0.033) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
Industrial Output as % of -0.044 -0.030 -0.029 -0.034 -0.036
Total Output (0.042) (0.178) (0.174) (0.035) (0.017)
Border Tension in year of -0.099 -0.154 -0.154 -0.093 -0.049
Observation (0.481) (0.313) (0.306) (0.492) (0.700)
Domestic Debt as % of 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Total Expenditure (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.012)
Overall Deficit as % of GDP 0.005
(0.467)
Constant 0.706 0.417 0.412 0.486 0.560
(0.351) (0.553) (0.552) (0.468) (0.377)
Adjusted R-squared 0.229 0.223 0.243 0.256 0.321
F- statistic 2.243 2.349 2.678 2.764 3.366
(0.034) (0.029) (0.016) (0.014) (0.004)
Sample Restrictions on 
Dependent Variable
(-1.5,2.5) (-1.5,2.5) (-1.5,2.5) (-1.5,2.5) (-1.5,2.5)
No.of Observations 47 48 48 47 46
72
TABLE B2: Correlates o f the Vulnerability of Defense Expenditures
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5
% Decline in Real Total 
Gov. Exp.
State and Local Gov. Budget 
as % of Central Gov. Budget
-1.023
(0.710)
0.173
(0.881)
-0.806
(0.733)
-0.847
(0.713)
-0.414
(0.851)
-0.201
(0.929)
Economic Ideology -0.105
(0.750)
0.118
(0.688)
0.109
(0.692)
0.275
(0.311)
0.325
(0.268)
Political Democracy 
ACR Index of Instability
0.055
(0.969)
-0.591
(0.038)
-0.011
(0.924)
-0.646
(0.008)
-0.641
(0.006)
-0.671
(0.003)
-0.054
(0.633)
-0.695
(0.003)
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 
as % GDP
0.005
(0.526)
0.010
(0.179)
0.009
(0.170)
0.009
(0.186)
0.009
(0.167)
Share of Labor in Industrial 
Sector
-0.029
(0.333)
-0.047
(0.068)
-0.047
(0.066)
-0.042
(0.085)
-0.043
(0.082)
Industrial Output as % of 
Total Output
-0.102
(0.004)
-0.093
(0.002)
-0.093
(0.002)
-0.094
(0.001)
-0.096
(0.001)
Border Tension in Year of 
Observation
0.548
(0.040)
0.404
(0.076)
0.401
(0.073)
0.388
(0.070)
0.400
(0.066)
Total Expenditure as a % of 
GDP
-0.052
(0.024)
-0.063
(0.004)
-0.063
(0.003)
-0.057
(0.005)
-0.058
(0.005)
Real GNP per Capita 0.00016
(0.177)
0.00018
(0.046)
0.00018
(0.025)
0.00014
(0.067)
0.00013
(0.147)
Constant 4.599
(0.000)
4.477
(0.000)
4.441
(0.000)
3.906
(0.000)
4.068
(0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.171 0.210 0.225 0.250 0.239
F- statistic 1.922
(0.067)
2.647 
(0.011)
2.996
(0.006)
3.265
(0.003)
2.918
(0.006)
Sample Restrictions (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5)
No.of Observations 50 63 63 62 62
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TABLE B3: Correlates of the Vulnerability o f Public Order and Safety
Expenditures
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5
% Decline in Real Total 8.703 8.146 12.340 13.456 18.137
Gov. Exp. (0.054) (0.170) (0.141) (0.115) (0.057)
State and Local Gov. Budget 0.497 1.788
as % of Central Gov. Budget (0.770) (0.555)
Economic Ideology 2.561 2.505 2.912 3.033 2.911
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Political Democracy -0.561 -0.593 -0.092 -0.199 -0.303
(0.000) (0.045) (0.757) (0.534) (0.432)
ACR Index of Instability -1.179 -1.142 -0.089 -0.419 -0.069
(0.006) (0.048) (0.856) (0.487) (0.919)
Central Gov. Budget Deficit -0.058 -0.062 -0.034 -0.035 -0.032
as % GDP (0.000) (0.001) (0.049) (0.048) (0.093)
Share of Labor in Industrial -0.088 -0.074 -0.117 -0.134 -0.190
Sector (0.026) (0.241) (0.119) (0.087) (0.063)
Industrial Output as % of 0.290 0.306 0.196 0.195 0.204
Total Output (0.000) (0.003) (0.117) (0.121) (0.122)
Border Tension in year of 0.163 0.023 0.621 0.474
Observation (0.715) (0.959) (0.342) (0.519)
Overall Deficit as a % of -0.324 -0.367 -0.343 -0.318 -0.292
GDP (0.001) (0.008) (0.025) (0.040) (0.109)
Real GNP per Capita 0.0004 0.0004
(0.079) (0.052)
Dependency Ratio (% of 0.211 0.219
population under 14 and over (0.000) (0.001)
60 years)
Constant -26.402 -27.790 -10.167 -9.720
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.041)
Adjusted R-squared 0.896 0.872 0.537 0.536 0.569
F- statistic 19.730 12.370 4.478 4.079 3.641
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Sample Restrictions (-6,8) (-6,8) (-6,8) (-6,8) (-6,8)
No.of Observations 25 21 25 25 21
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TABLE B4: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f Education Expenditures
1 2 3 4 5
2.546 2.898 1.085 -2.021
(0.239) (0.166) (0.608) (0.319)
2.505 2.548 2.331 2.171
(0.0385) (0.034) (0.062) (0.070)
-0.032 -0.043 0.062 0.059 0.142
(0.893) (0.857) (0.801) (0.810) (0.537)
-0.120 -0.128 -0.130 -0.124 -0.148
(0.246) (0.211) (0.228) (0.241) (0.151)
-0.250 -0.264 -0.535 -0.495 -0.181
(0.351) (0.321) (0.029)) (0.031) (0.345)
0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.081) (0.074) (0.170) (0.174) (0.214)
-0.079 -0.079 -0.066 -0.064 -0.042
(0.008) (0.008) (0.027) (0.029) (0.102)
-0.119 -0.121 -0.130 -0.124 -0.086
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
-0.094 -0.092 -0.105 -0.101 -0.072
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
-0.108 -0.192 -0.206 -0.225
(0.495) (0.233) (0.191) (0.165)
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003
(0.220) (0.231) (0.140) (0.142) (0.274)
-0.324 -0.367
(0.001) (0.008)
-0.00046 -0.00047 -0.00037 -0.00036 -0.00023
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
-0.035 -0.035 -0.047 -0.045 -0.040
(0.083) (0.082) (0.021) (0.022) (0.043)
-0.038 -0.041
(0.045) (0.024)
11.325 11.530 8.908 8.733 6.868
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.296 0.306 0.234 0.249 0.158
2.531 2.726 2.202 2.408 1.969
(0.012) (0.008) (0.029) (0.019) (0.048)
(2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5)
52 52 52 52 63
Independent variables
% Decline in Real Total Gov 
Exp.
State and Local Gov. Budget 
as % of Central Gov. Budget 
Economic Ideology
Political Democracy
ACR Index of Instability
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 
as % GDP
Share of Labor in Industrial 
Sector
Industrial Output as % of 
Total Output
Agricultural Output as a % of 
Total Output
Border Tension in Year of 
Observation
Domestic Debt as a % of 
Total Expenditure 
Overall Deficit as a % of 
GDP
Real GNP per Capita
Total Expenditure as a % of 
GDP
Dependency Ratio (% of 
population under 14 and over 
60 years)
Constant
Adjusted R-squared
statistic
Sample Restrictions
^o.of Observations
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TABLE B5: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f Health Expenditures
Independent variables
% Decline in Real Total 3.366 3.189 3.380 3.223 3.656
Gov. Exp. (0.043) (0.056) (0.046) (0.065) (0.099)
State and Local Gov. Budget 1.817 1.667 1.680 0.394 0.154
as % of Central Gov. Budget (0.041) (0.059) (0.058) (0.603) (0.878)
Economic Ideology -0.392 -0.380 -0.347 -0.473 -0.334
(0.041) (0.049) (0.079) (0.022) (0.171)
Political Democracy -0.065 0.039 0.029
(0.430) (0.608) (0.770)
Political Instability 0.661
(0.178)
ACR Index of Instability 0.253 0.253 0.230 0.362
(0.068) (0.070) (0.108) (0.012)
Central Gov. Budget Deficit -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.00002 -0.0022
as % GDP (0.383) (0.586) (0.652) (0.999) (0.626)
Agricultural Output as a % -0.016
of Total Output (0.187)
Border Tension in Year of -0.477 -0.453 -0.433 -0.441 -0.236
Observation (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.042) (0.153)
Real GNP per Capita -0.00021 -0.00015 -0.00018 0.00006
(0.007) (0.016) (0.014) (0.241)
Country at War in Year of
Observation
Constant 1.189 1.362 1.577 0.096 -0.049
(0.035) (0.007) (0.006) (0.075) (0.948)
Adjusted R-squared 0.340 0.327 0.321 0.230 0.190
F- statistic 4.150 4.402 3.898 3.089 1.143
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.357)
Sample Restrictions (-1.5,2.5) (-1.5,2.5) (-1.5,2.5) (-1.5,2.5) (-1.5,2.5)
No.of Observations 50 50 50 50 48
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TABLE B6: Correlates of the Vulnerability o f Social Security and Welfare
Expenditures
Independent variables
% Decline in Real Total 0.482 3.059 1.162 0.676
Gov. Exp. (0.799) (0.124) (0.544) (0.742)
State and Local Gov. Budget 2.077 2.044 3.580 3.072 2.126
as % of Central Gov. Budget (0.030) (0.029) (0.000) (0.004) (0.013)
Economic Ideology 0.757 0.759 0.677 0.693 0.550
(0.001) (0.008) (0.01) (0.013) (0.036)
Political Democracy -0.176 -0.170 -0.253 -0.228 -0.063
(0.097) (0.095) (0.012) (0.030) (0.504)
Political Instability -0.344
(0.440)
ACR Index of Instability -0.217 -0.217 -0.304 -0.470
(0.331) (0.323) (0.126) (0.021)
Central Gov. Budget Deficit -0.013 -0.013 -0.017 -0.019 -0.013
as % GDP (0.088) (0.077) (0.016) (0.009) (0.062)
Share of Labor in Industrial -0.097 -0.097 -0.095 -0.079 -0.099
Sector (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.023) (0.001)
Industrial Output as % of -0.039 -0.038 -0.046 -0.045 -0.020
Total Output (0.097) (0.095) (0.026) (0.041) (0.338)
Foreign Debt as a % of Total 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.006
Expenditure (0.046) (0.041) (0.010) (0.016) (0.085)
Border Tension in Year of -0.375 -0.388 -0.283 -0.351 -0.327
Observation (0.046) (0.030) (0.091) (0.049) (0.087)
Domestic Debt as a % of 0.0046 0.0046 0.0054 0.0050 0.001
Total Expenditure (0.096) (0.090) (0.029) (0.047) (0.550)
Overall Deficit as a % of -0.324 -0.367
GDP (0.001) (0.008)
Real GNP per Capita -0.00046 -0.00045 -0.00061 -0.00047 -0.00034
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Dependency Ratio (% of -0.030 -0.029 -0.035 -0.015
oopulation under 14 and over (0.075) (0.066) (0.023) (0.364)
60 years)
Constant 4.002 3.896 4.480 1.443 2.666
(0.021) (0.019) (0.004) (0.059) (0.096)
Adjusted R-squared 0.265 0.286 0.381 0.285 0.328
statistic 2.185 2.416 2.932 2.352 2.537
(0.033) (0.020) (0.007) (0.025) (0.016)
Sample Restrictions (-2,4) (-2,4) (-2,4) (-2,4) (-2,4)
'4o.of Observations 47 47 45 45 45
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TABLE B7: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f Housing and Community
Amenities Expenditures
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5
-6.022 -6.023 -2.700 -2.170 -2.493
(0.201) 
;t 1.422 
:t (0.415)
(0.175)
1.422
(0.406)
(0.514) (0.587) (0.542)
0.210 0.210 -0.323 -0.413 -0.450
(0.635) (0.629) (0.464) (0.314) (0.282)
0.560 0.560 0.433 0.442 0.308
(0.015) (0.012) (0.041) (0.036) (0.114)
-1.760 -1.760 -1.208 -1.359 -1.211
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.001) (0.003)
0.044 0.044 0.053 0.057 0.059
(0.051) (0.045) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008)
0.160 0.160 0.139 0.134 0.149
(0.002)
0.723
(0.339)
(0.002)
0.724
(0.317)
(0.001)
0.424
(0.556)
(0.001) (0.000)
-0.020 -0.020 -0.023 -0.024 -0.026
(0.031)
0.00036
(0.999)
(0.024) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003)
-0.086 -0.086 -0.084 -0.090 -0.063
(0.035) (0.029) (0.036) (0.019) (0.008)
0.00056 0.00056 0.00040 0.00037
(0.046) (0.040) (0.085) (0.101)
0.129 0.129 0.077 0.092 0.051
(0.021) (0.019) (0.075) (0.008) (0.068)
-13.110 -13.11 -6.300 -5.994 -1.963
(0.008) (0.006) (0.072) (0.081) (0.414)
0.466 0.482 0.435 0.443 0.420
3.950 4.417 4.707 5.221 5.273
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7)
45 45 54 54 54
% Decline in Real Total 
Gov. Exp.
Economic Ideology
Political Democracy
Political Instability
ACR Index of Instability
Central Gov. Budget Defici 
as % GDP
Share of Labor in Industrial 
Sector
Average Population Growth 
Rate
Foreign Debt as a % of Tota 
Expenditure
Border Tension in Year of 
Observation
Total Expenditure as a % of 
GDP
Real GNP per Capita
Dependency Ratio (% of 
population under 14 and over 
60 years)
Constant
Adjusted R-squared
F- statistic
Sample Restrictions
No.of Observations
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TABLE B8: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f Other Community and Social
Services Expenditures
Independent variables 1
% Decline in Real Total 
Gov. Exp.
State and Local Gov. Budget 
as % of Central Gov. Budget 
Economic Ideology
Political Democracy
Political Instability
ACR Index of Instability
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 
as % GDP
Share of Labor in Industrial 
Sector
Average Population Growth 
Rate
Border Tension in Year of 
Observation
Total Expenditure as a % of 
GDP
Industrial Output as a % of 
Total Output
Agricultural Output as % of
Total Output
Constant
0.177
(0.966)
4.997
(0.005)
1.441
(0.003)
-0.089
(0.678)
-0.448
(0.283)
-0.006
(0.501)
0.029
(0.605)
2.812
(0.000)
-0.045
(0.903)
-0.097
(0.013)
-0.161
(0.013)
-0.127
(0.015)
0.183
(0.952)
0.293
(0.942)
4.989
(0.005)
1.436
(0.003)
-0.092
(0.665)
-0.471
(0.203)
-0.006
(0.496)
0.027
(0.610)
2.786
(0.000)
-0.098
(0.009)
-0.160
(0.012)
-0.124
(0.014)
0.248
(0.933)
-0.948
(0.812)
4.275
(0.021)
1.326
(0.006)
-0.040
(0.855)
- 1.100
(0.162)
-0.006
(0.414)
0.048
(0.432)
2.748
(0.000)
-0.086
(0.012)
-0.125
(0.018)
- 0.102
(0.041)
-0.474
(0.858)
3.702
(0.398)
3.427
(0.062)
0.939
(0.056)
-0.182
(0.433)
-0.441
(0.265)
-0.004
(0.700)
1.984
(0.001)
-0.091
(0.018)
-0.136
(0.038)
- 0.100
(0.064)
2.209
(0.325)
-0.097
(0.982)
4.992
(0.005)
1.442
(0.003)
-0.081
(0.709)
-0.438
(0.264)
4.992
(0.005)
0.028
(0.605)
2.844
(0.000)
-0.090
(0.784)
-0.098
(0.095)
-0.162
(0.012)
-0.128
(0.015)
0.265
(0.930)
Adjusted R-squared
F- statistic
Sample Restrictions
0.348
3.091
(0.005)
(-5,7)
0.366 0.353 0.187
(-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7)
0.349
3.465 3.285 2.199 3.101
(0.002) (0.004) (0.037) (0.004)
(-5,7)
No.of Observations 48 48 47 53 48
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TABLE B9: Correlates of the Vulnerability o f Fuel and Energy Expenditures
Independent variables 1
% Decline in Real Total 
Gov. Exp.
State and Local Gov. Budget 
as % of Central Gov. Budget 
Economic Ideology
Political Democracy
Political Instability
-30.801
(0.003)
-6.174
(0.082)
-1.548
(0.077)
0.768
(0.043)
-30.360
(0.000)
-6.300
(0.045)
-1.430
(0.087)
0.0823
(0.017)
-25.710
(0.002)
-8.288
(0.022)
-1.760
(0.070)
0.944
(0.018)
-26.880
(0.001)
-7.082
(0.037)
-2.067
(0.027)
1.289
(0.003)
-28.058
(0.001)
-8.182
(0.023)
-2.290
(0.018)
1.408
(0.002)
ACR Index of Instability 1.026 0.708 1.825 1.926 2.155
(0.220) (0.336) (0.019) (0.009) (0.006)
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 
as % GDP
Share of Labor in Industrial 0.427 0.435 0.341 0.339 0.346
Sector
Border Tension in Year of 
Observation
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
Total Expenditure as a % of 0.311 0.327 0.251 0.277 0.290
GDP (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Overall Deficit as a % of 0.462 0.519 0.281 0.416 0.478
GDP (0.016) (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010)
Domestic Debt as a % of 0.012 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.0256
Total Expenditure (0.394) (0.210) (0.449) (0.157) (0.090)
Dependency Ratio (%of 0.147 0.190
population under 14 and over 
60)
(0.053) (0.007)
Country at War in Year of -3.399 -3.149 -2.193 -1.910 -2.327
Observation (0.026) (0.019) (0.132) (0.157) (0.090)
Constant -15.169 -19.320 -3.173 -4.420 -6.598
(0.036) (0.005) (0.331) (0.157) (0.084)
Adjusted R-squared 0.435 0.571 0.409 0.508 0.512
F- statistic 3.310 4.757 3.146 4.100 3.860
(0.008) (0.001) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005)
Sample Restrictions (-5,15) (-5,15) (-5,15) (-5,15) (-.5,15)
No.of Observations 34 32 32 31 31
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TABLE BIO: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f Agriculture and Forestry
Expenditures
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5
% Decline in Real Total -3.969 -2.990 -3.994 -6.277 -7.600
Gov. Exp. (0.480) (0.602) (0.471) (0.216) (0.169)
State and Local Gov. Budget 5.023 3.705 4.974 4.587 3.409
as % of Central Gov. Budget (0.039) (0.098) (0.038) (0.034) (0.121)
Economic Ideology -0.542 -1.110 -0.505 -0.938 -1.551
(0.430) (0.086) (0.451) (0.135) (0.021)
Political Democracy -0.622 -0.620 -0.620 -0.479 -0.329
(0.063) (0.012) (0.060) (0.107) (0.193)
Political Instability 0.401 0.454 0.666
(0.753) (0.716) (0.555)
ACR Index of Instability 0.266
(0.555)
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 0.009 0.015 0.010 0.007 0.005
as % GDP (0.407) (0.182) (0.359) (0.487) (0.629)
Share of Labor in Industrial -0.208 -0.124 -0.209 -0.122 -0.014
Sector (0.007) (0.020) (0.006) (0.095) (0.823)
Industrial Output as % of -0.107 -0.138 -0.107 -0.088 -0.089
Total Output (0.064) (0.017) (0.061) (0.086) (0.144)
Border Tension in Year of 0.163 0.023
Observation (0.715) (0.959)
Overall Deficit as a % of -0.129 -0.063 -0.128 -0.126 -0.150
GDP (0.048) (0.298) (0.047) (0.031) (0.085)
Domestic Debt as a % of -0.018 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
Total Expenditure (0.058) (0.244) (0.053) (0.030) (0.054)
Constant 10.264 11.097 10.154 9.029 8.643
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Adjusted R-squared 0.279 0.271 0.298 0.322 0.215
F- statistic 2.553 2.858 2.868 3.042 2.207
(0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.042)
Sample Restrictions (-8,10) (-8,10) (-8,10) (-8,10) (-8,10)
No. of Observations 45 51 45 44 45
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TABLE B l l :  Correlates of the Vulnerability o f Mining, M aterials and
M anufacturing Expenditures
Independent variables
% Decline in Real Total 
Gov. Exp.
State and Local Gov. Budget 
as % of Central Gov. Budget 
Economic Ideology
Political Democracy
Political Instability
ACR Index of Instability
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 
as % GDP
Share of Labor in Industrial 
Sector
Border Tension in Year of 
Observation
Agricultural Output as a % 
of Total Output 
Industrial Output as a % of 
Total Output 
Foreign Debt as a % of Total 
Expenditure 
Real GNP per Capita
Dependency Ratio (% of 
population under 14 and 
over 60 years)
Constant
-15.037
(0.079)
-14.700
(0.064)
-23.418
(0.015)
-19.265
(0.0308)
-20.325
(0.008)
6.666 5.671 -5.363 -4.713 -5.570
(0.155) (0..202) (0.173) (0.192) (0.092)
-2.322 -2.196 -2.715 -3.281 -2.431
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.245 -0.350 0.306 0.157 0.165
(0.640) (0.473) (0.419) (0.653 (0.599)
2.151 1.821 2.035 2.143 1.475
(0.008) (0.009) (0.065) (0.002) (0.009)
0.026 0.186 0.018
(0.116)
-0.231 -0.242
(0.296) (0.267)
(0.046) (0.029)
-1.217 -1.425 -0.847 -0.576 -0.171
(0.083) (0.037) (0.236) (0.383) (0.744)
-0.280 -0.283
(0.004) (0.002)
-0.420 -0.424 -0.150 -0.187 -0.163
(0.005) (0.000)
0.016
(0.103) (0.031) (0.021)
(0.029)
-0.0026 -0.0024
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.193 -0.184
(0.016) (0.010)
48.31 47.24 12.123 13.718 12.272
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.540 0.573 0.300 0.387 0.309
5.499 6.265 3.629 4.791 5.033
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
(-10,12.5) (-10,12.5) (-10,12.5) (-10,12.5) (-10,12.5)
47 48 50 49 64
Adjusted R-squared
F- statistic
Sample Restrictions
No. of Observations
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TABLE B12: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f Transportation and
Communication Expenditures
Independent variables
% Decline in Real Total 
Gov. Exp.
State and Local Gov. Budget 
as % of Central Gov. Budget 
Economic Ideology
Political Democracy
Political Instability
-0.986
(0.628)
-0.514
(0.305)
-0.003
(0.988)
0.789
(0.855)
-1.093
(0..572)
-0.808
(0.106)
-0.024
(0.907)
-0.192
(0.964)
-0.104
(0.957)
-0.737
(0.131)
-0.129
(0.536)
1.516
(0.733)
-3.123
(0.057)
-0.953
(0.058)
0.133
(0.442)
0.873
(0.848)
-2.836
(0.081)
-1.113
(0.025)
0.154
(0.369)
ACR Index of Instability -1.648 -1.426 0.224 0.267 0.268
(0.014) (0.026) (0.563) (0.439) (0.425)
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 0.034
as % GDP (0.068)
Average Population Growth -1.504 -1.661
Rate (0.043) (0.021)
Border Tension in Year of -1.055 -0.980 -0.306 -0.354 -0.675
Observation (0.012) (0.016) (0.407) (0.365) (0.038)
Overall Deficit as a % of 0.281 0.253 0.171 0.119 0.147
GDP (0.01) (0.003) (0.020) (0.091) (0.030)
Industrial Output as a % of 0.156 0.169 0.161 0.183 0.167
Total Output (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign Debt as a % of Total -0.020 -0.005
Expenditure (0.026) (0.025)
Domestic Debt as % of 0.023 0.023 0.0131 0.012 0.012
Total Expenditure (0.002) (0.012) (0.056) (0.093) (0.077)
Real GNP per Capita 0.00008 0.00001 -0.0005
(0.780) (0.958) (0.018)
Dependency Ratio (% of 0.192
population under 14 and (0.013)
over 60 years)
Constant -12.62 -10.79 2.705 0.172
(0.033) (0.056) (0.135) (0.910)
Adjusted R-squared 0.280 0.308 0.306 0.193 0.208
F- statistic 2.800 2.853 2.796 2.199 2.490
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.038) (0.022)
Sample Restrictions (-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7)
No. of Observations 52 51 50 51 52
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TABLE B13: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f Other Economic Affairs
Expenditures
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5
-4.896 -0.098 -0.465 0.068 -0.579
(0.322) (0.631) (0.910) (0.984) (0.885)
2.777 2.445 2.218 1.087
(0.068) (0.116) (0.144) (0.390)
-0.069 -0.214 -0.171 0.008 -0.062
(0.874) (0.631) (0.698) (0.982) (0.887)
0.156 0.300 0.276 0.268 0.196
(0.401) (0.090) (0.110) (0.602) (0.268)
-1.616 -1.148 -0.925 -1.524
(0.056) (0.157) (0.224) (0.024)
-0.274
(0.421)
0.019 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.017
(0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.023)
-0.591 -0.529 -0.597 -0.191 -0.223
(0.061) (0.102) (0.058) (0.478) (0.531)
-0.130 -0.104 -0.102 -0.106 -0.099
(0.006) (0.018) (0.019) (0.004) (0.028)
-0.173 -0.173
(0.104) (0.104)
-0.084 -0.026
(0.068) (0.370)
6.682 4.337 3.505 3.667 2.637
(0.006) (0.023) (0.030) (0.007) (0.054)
0.349 0.290 0.295 0.440 0.142
2.609 2.361 2.570 3.755 1.621
(0.033) (0.050) (0.038) (0.008) (0.176)
(-2.5,45) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5) (-2.5,4.5)
31 31 31 29 31
% Decline in Real Total 
Gov. Exp.
State and Local Gov. Budget 
as % of Central Gov. Budget 
Economic Ideology
Political Democracy
Political Instability
ACR Index of Instability
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 
as % GDP
Share of Labor in Industrial 
Sector
Border Tension in Year of 
Observation
Agricultural Output as a % 
of Total Output 
Industrial Output as a % of 
Total Output
Overall Deficit as a % of 
GDP
Total Expenditure as a % of
GDP
Constant
Adjusted R-squared
statistic
Sample Restrictions
No. of Observations
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TABLE B14: Correlates o f the Vulnerability o f Other Expenditures
Independent variables 1
% Decline in Real Total 
Gov. Exp.
State and Local Gov. Budget 
as % of Central Gov. Budget 
Economic Ideology
Political Democracy
Political Instability
ACR Index of Instability
Central Gov. Budget Deficit 
as % GDP
Share of Labor in Industrial 
Sector
Border Tension in Year of 
Observation
Agricultural Output as a % 
of Total Output 
Industrial Output as a % of 
Total Output
Domestic Debt as a % of 
Total Expenditure 
Real GNP per Capita
Average Population Growth 
Rate
Country at War in Year of
Observation
Constant
1.995
(0.695)
-4.704
(0.083)
-1.274
(0.040)
0.413
(0.111)
-0.093
(0.846)
0.087
(0.135)
0.136
(0.027)
0.144
(0.062)
- 0.022
(0.005)
0.00079
(0.006)
-1.410
(0.033)
3.164
(0.002)
-3.856
(0.256)
5.394
(0.303)
0.820
(0.688)
-0.663
(0.271)
0.355
(0.130)
-0.672
(0.124)
0.024
(0.676)
-0.013
(0.081)
-1.476
(0.014)
2.566
(0.008)
3.075
(0.229)
2.809
(0.563)
2.193
(0.248)
-0.438
(0.417)
0.406
(0.066)
-0.641
(0.118)
-1.215
(0.014)
2.248
(0.014)
2.460
(0.169)
3.307
(0.497)
2.277
(0.216)
-0.353
(0.512)
0.391
(0.076)
-0.638
(0.115)
1.090
(0.011)
-1.188
(0.015)
2.071
(0.241)
2.106
(0.674)
3.404
(0.082)
-0.740
(0.185)
0.276
(0,285)
0.884
(0.340)
0.702
(0.081)
-0.011 -0.009 -0.006
(0.094) (0.160) (0.352)
-1.083
(0.027)
2.250
(0.242)
Adjusted R-squared
F- statistic
Sample Restrictions
0.235
2.385
(0.019)
(-5,7)
0.123
1.844
(0.086)
0.135 0.142 0.120
2.131 2.199 1.938
(0.050) (0.043) (0.076)
(-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7) (-5,7)
No. of Observations 55 55 59 59 56
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